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MUDDY WATERS: ALLIS-CHALMERS AND THE
FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING LABOR ARBITRATION
JoHN J. COLEMAN, III*
Much of the attention given to the dynamic relationship between state
court jurisdiction and the federal labor laws focuses upon the pre-emptive
strength of various unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).' Arbitral pre-emption, an equally significant pre-
emptive force not found in express NLRA language, frequently is overlooked
or misunderstood. Arbitral pre-emption arises from the judicially created
federal policy favoring the resolution of labor disputes exclusively through
the grievance and arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Unlike its Railway Labor Act counterpart, 2 this NLRA policy is not
spelled out in express statutory language, but rather arises from the Supreme
Court's construction of Sections 203(d) and 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 3
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,4
has expanded the pre-emptive strength of this policy, but the Court still
leaves unanswered questions about the policy's precise parameters.
This article traces the history of arbitral pre-emption from its origins,
examines ways in which lower courts have misused and misunderstood
principal authorities, evaluates the impact of Allis-Chalmers, and considers
how the law will develop after Allis-Chalmers. The article reaches three
conclusions. First, although correcting many lower court distortions, Allis-
Chalmers has encouraged others to flourish. Second, uncertainty in the
boundaries of exceptions to arbitral pre-emption remains the chief difficulty
with the doctrine. Finally, the further defining of these boundaries will be
* A.B. (1978), J.D. (1981), Duke University. Mr. Coleman is associated with the firm
of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, Alabama.
1. See generally Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Omo
ST. L. J. 277 (1980); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
2. See generally 45 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car, 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
4. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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influenced by the extent to which government protection, by expansion of
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, replaces traditional union griev-
ance and arbitration protection as the employee's principal remedy.
I. TrE DEVELOPMENT OF ARBiTRAL PR-EMPTiON-THm
BUILDING BLOCKS
Presently, the NLRA, as amended, exercises pre-emptive force over
state court jurisdiction in two ways. The Supreme Court's decision in
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale5 identifies each:
Our cases have announced two doctrines for determining whether
state regulations or causes are pre-empted by the NLRA. Under the
first, set out in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U,S. 236 [ (1959), state regulations and causes of action are
presumptively pre-empted if they concern conduct that is actually
or arguably either prohibited or protected by the Act .. the state
regulation or causes of action may, however, be sustained if the
behavior to be regulated is behavior that is of only peripheral
concern to the federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility... Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S.
290, 296-97 (1977). In such cases, the State's interest in controlling
or remedying the effect of the conduct is balanced against both the
interference with the National Labor Relations Board's ability to
adjudicate controversies committed to it by the Act, Farmer v.
Carpenters, supra, at 297 ... and the risk that the State will
sanction conduct that the Act protects. The second pre-emption
doctrine, set out in Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), proscribes state regulation and state-
law causes of action concerning conduct that Congress intended to
be unregulated .... 6
A review of the evolution of the doctrine of labor law pre-emption, of
the policy favoring arbitration, and of the interaction of the two to create
arbitral pre-emption, reveals how arbitral pre-emption developed.
A. Early Cases
Early cases addressing the issue of federal law's pre-emptive scope
confused the two types of labor law pre-emption. Generally, early cases
held that a state could not interfere with conduct actually protected or
actually prohibited by the NLRA, but that the state could, for reasons
independent of NLRA concerns, regulate conduct arguably within the scope
of the Act when Congress had provided no corresponding federal remedy. 7
The Supreme Court struck down efforts by states to impose concurrent
5, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
6. Id. at 498-99.
7. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213 n.9.
[Vol. 44:345
MUDDY WATERS
regulations upon matters covered by the NLRA. Garner v. Teamsters Union'
struck down a state court injunction prohibiting recognitional picketing as
a matter committed by Congress to a centralized tribunal, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), within that tribunal's authority to remedy,
and not within state police power. Weber v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc.9 held that
a state court might not enjoin conduct in connection with a jurisdictional
dispute covered by section 8(b)(4)(D).10 The Court allowed more latitude in
these early decisions when Congress had neither actually protected nor
actually prohibited the conduct affected by state regulation or when Congress
provided no remedy for persons aggrieved. The Court most frequently
allowed the state claims to stand when they reached coercive and violent
strike methods." International Union of United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board,'2 however, extended this rationale outside the
context of violence, holding that a state agency could enjoin intermittent
work stoppages because they were not actually protected or prohibited by
federal labor law, which reached only the strike's objective and not its
methods. Finally, the Court repeatedly allowed state courts to award dam-
ages for traditional common law torts that occurred in the course of NLRA
protected activity.'
3
B. The Garmon Doctrine
Modern pre-emption began with San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon. "4 The Supreme Court in Garmon held that an employer group's
state labor and tort law damages action against a union group for recog-
nitional picketing was pre-empted even though the NLRB had declined
jurisdiction over an election petition arising out of the same dispute.
Emphasizing, as in Garner, the NLRB's role as Congress's centralized forum
for defining the NLRA's scope, the Court held judicial participation limited
to determining whether the Act "arguably protected" or "arguably prohib-
ited" the activity the state sought to regulate. The Court rejected, as overly
narrow, the International Union of United Auto Workers doctrine declaring
that a court finds pre-emption only when the activity was "actually"
protected or prohibited.'
Having "due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal
8. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
9. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1982). Other decisions reached similar conclusions. See
International Union of United Auto Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); LaCrosse Tel.
Corp. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
11. See, e.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Allen-Bradley Local
No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
12. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
13. See International Union of United Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640-41
(1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954).
14. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
15. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 and n.4.
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system,' 16 the Court in Garmon declared that activity arguably protected
or prohibited by the NLRA nevertheless was not pre-empted if it was
"merely a peripheral concern" to the Act, 17 or, "where the regulated conduct
touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that,
in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the Court] ... could
not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.'
' 8 If
an activity did not fall within one of these exceptions, it was not subject
to state regulation unless the NLRB made a "clear determination that an
activity is neither protected nor prohibited."' 19 The Board's mere failure to
determine the status of such activity, either by declining jurisdiction or by
the General Counsel's refusal to file a charge, would not be sufficient to
prevent pre-emption.
Garmon did not just establish that Congress had selected a forum-the
NLRB-as prescribed rules governing the resolution of labor disputes. Garmon
also made clear that a presumption favored pre-emption once activity was
found arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the NLRA without regard
to the method of regulation20 or the remedy sought. 2' The Garmon decision
presumed no pre-emption only in cases "deeply rooted in local feeling," an
exception the Court limited to measures taken to keep the peace.
2 2
Applying Garmon, the Court in Linn v. Local 114 United Plant Guard
Workers of America23 held that the NLRB's narrow focus on election
language and the absence of any NLRA section 8(c) protection of malicious
libel rendered a supervisor's defamation claim against a union only "of
peripheral concern" to federal labor law.24 According to Linn, defamation
actions involving actual malice and actual damage survive pre-emption by
16. Id. at 243.
17. Id. at 244.
18. Id. at 246; see id. at 245.
19. Id. at 246.
20. Id. at 244.
21. Id. at 246.
22. Id. at 247.
23. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
24. Id. at 61; see generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). At first blush, Linn appeared to
expand substantially state court jurisdiction over labor matters, allowing a state remedy to
exist with the potential for conflict notwithstanding the Court's admonition in Garner that
identical remedies were impermissible because of the mere potential for conflict. See Garner
v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1953). However, closer examination of this decision
revealed that the contrary was true. Garmon did not find it determinative that the Board had
declined to exercise its election jurisdiction, emphasizing that the Board had not made a
determination concerning unfair labor practice jurisdiction. In Linn, by contrast, the Board
had declined unfair labor practice jurisdiction over the acts complained of in the state law
action, thus removing any practical possibility of conflicting remedies. In addition, the Court
treated both considerations of the peripheral nature of the state claim and the importance of
the state's interest, and did not indicate whether, as Garmon makes clear, one of these elements
without the other could justify exception from pre-emption. Finally, in recognizing defamation
as exempt in some circumstances from pre-emption, the Court linked it to the state torts




NLRA unfair labor practice provisions when the Board has declined unfair
labor practice jurisdiction because reputation is a peripheral concern of the
NLRA, and state defamation claims serve the traditional state interest of
preventing violence.2
The Supreme Court further clarified pre-emption in Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Employees v. Lockridge,26 holding pre-empted an employee's
contract claim against his union. The Court declared that there would be
no pre-emption (1) "when Congress has affirmatively declared that [judicial]
power should exist," 27 (2) "whe[n] th[e] Court cannot . . .'conscientiously
presume that Congress meant to intrude so deeply into areas traditionally
left to local law,' "2 or (3) "whe[n] the particular rule of law sought to
be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that,
in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that initial supervision will
not disserve the interests promoted by the federal labor statutes." 29
Lockridge reemphasized, as in Garner and Garmon, that Congress chose
a forum, as well as prescribing rules, for the resolution of labor disputes.10
Lockridge also made clear that the issue of pre-emption turned on the act
being regulated and not on the particular state tort challenging the act.
31
Finally, Lockridge recognized a broader federal pre-emption when the
conduct subject to state regulation directly affected the employment rela-
tionship and when it involved the more peripheral relation between the
employee and his or her union.
32
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 2533 reversed the
state court's finding that Lockridge pre-empted an employee's outrage claim
against his union.34 The Court emphasized that Lockridge had expressly
rejected blanket pre-emption. The Court held that the important state
interest in remedying outrageous conduct, 3s like the important state interest
in remedying defamation in Linn, preserved the action from pre-emption
even though it involved the same hiring hall discrimination proscribed by
the NLRA.3 6 The Court explained that the NLRB was not concerned with
nor inclined to remedy the outrageous manner in which the union allegedly
25. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64.
26. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
27. Id. at 297.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 297-98.
30. Id. at 297-98. The Court recognized that "[clonflict in technique can be fully as
disruptive to the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy." Id. at 287. Congress
"sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy,
deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and developing the comprehensive legal
system in the hands of an expert administrative [system] ... rather than the federalized
judicial system." Id. at 288.
31. Id. at 292.
32. Id. at 296.
33. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
34. Id. at 294-95.
35. Id. at 299-303.
36. Id. at 300-03.
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discriminated, 7 but that the state had an important interest in providing
the remedy and could provide relief without inquiring into the object with
which the Board was concerned.38
Farmer represents a shift back from Lockridge's emphasis on the nature
of the "conduct" regulated to Linn's emphasis on the nature of the "state's
interest" in litigating. Farmer also revives the rationale of earlier cases that
viewed NLRB remedies as regulating only objectives and viewing state
remedies as regulating the means by which such objectives are accomplished.
Farmer continues to place emphasis on the "ability of the NLRB to remedy"
the act complained of as a determinant in ascertaining whether or not the
state claim should be pre-empted. Finally, Farmer extends Linn's violent
tort analogy to include outrage as well as defamation.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters"9
seems to combine Garmon's two exceptions into one. In preserving from
pre-emption an employer's trespass claim against the union, the Court
declared that pre-emption under this branch depended upon whether, "[flirst,
there exist[s] a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from the
challenged conduct," and "second, [whether] the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion over the tort claim entail[s] little risk of interference with the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Labor Board." 4 The Court combined these two factors
into the single inquiry of "whether the controversy presented to the state
court is identical to (as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that
which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board."14'
The Court held that there was no pre-emption under the "arguably
prohibited" branch because the state court's inquiry concerning picketing
location was different from the Board's focus upon the picketing's objec-
tive.42 Finding Garmon's "arguably protected" branch was limited based
upon the strength of the claim of "protected" status, the Court declared
that this branch did not pre-empt the plaintiff's trespass action because
trespass is generally unprotected 43 and the union had a fair opportunity to
claim to the Board that it was protected activity, but the union did not
avail itself at this opportunity.44
37. Id. at 304.
38. Id. at 304-05.
39. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Sears, Roebuck & Co. Court preserved from pre-emption
an employer's trespass claim against a union for picketing. See id.
40. Id. at 196.
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 207. Sears, Roebuck & Co. is extremely significant in the development of the
Garmon doctrine because it represents the first time after Garmon in which the Court held
that a state claim attacking conduct "arguably protected" by federal labor law was found not
pre-empted. Linn and Farmer involved arguably prohibited conduct. While earlier Garmon
progeny decisions had indicated no difference in application of the standard between situations
in which the conduct was arguably prohibited, Sears, Roebuck & Co. makes a clear distinction.
When the conduct is arguably prohibited, the principal concern is in allowing the NLRB,
Congress' chosen forum, to have the first opportunity to decide the case. When the conduct
is arguably protected, however, questions of federal supremacy, as well as NLRB primary
[Vol. 44:345
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International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 926 v. Jones45 found
pre-empted a discharged supervisor's claim against a union for intentional
interference with his employment contract. The Court held that Garmon
warranted pre-emption because the state cause of action, even if extending
to discharges not the result of coercion in violation of federal law, would
require state courts, rather than the Board, to determine initially whether
the union conduct was coercive."6 The Court makes clear in Jones that even
"deeply rooted" state interests in preserving tort actions sometimes must
give way to federal labor regulatory policies. 47 State tort elements, even if
completely different from federal unfair labor practice elements, nevertheless
are pre-empted if the resolution or application of the state elements would
require the state court to determine initially an element of the federal unfair
labor practice. Finally, the Court declared that the availability of greater
relief from the state tort claim than the relief which the Board would
provide in adjudicating unfair labor practice violations is irrelevant to the
pre-emption determination.
41
Three things about the Garmon doctrine are evident from the foregoing
discussion. First, Garmon recognizes that Congress not only prescribed the
rules, but also chose a forum for adjudicating unfair labor practice disputes,
however they arise. Second, the scope of Garmon pre-emption covers
penumbral areas defined by what the express language of the Act arguably
prohibits or arguably protects. Finally, this pre-emption is not complete,
but has exceptions in instances in which federalism dictates that the state
claim be preserved. This third factor is the center of the controversy. The
extent to which this factor focuses on the conduct regulated, rather than
on the state's reason for regulating, significantly affects the scope of Garmon
pre-emption. The scope of Garmon pre-emption is also affected by the
extent to which the reviewing court focuses on the comparative strength
and suitability of state and federal remedies. Whatever the scope, however,
jurisdiction, become significant. Pre-emption of arguably protected conduct, therefore, is "at
least in part, a function of the strength of the argument that § 7 does in fact protect the
disputed conduct." 436 U.S. at 203. Sears, Roebuck & Co. is also significant in that it chose,
as a measure of the significance of the "arguably protected" claim the willingness of the
union to file an unfair labor practice charge. If the union has a fair opportunity to invoke
NLRB jurisdiction, but does not avail itself of the opportunity, the Court concluded that the
union "retains meaningful protection against the risk of error in a state tribunal." Id. at 207.
There are two limitations to be noted concerning Sears, Roebuck & Co. First, the Court itself
admitted that the nature of the particular trespass involved almost certainly was not protected
conduct. Id. at 207. Second, the employer itself had no means of invoking the Board's
jurisdiction in this case. Invoking state court jurisdiction was its only viable option. Id. at
202. A case that had involved conduct closer to the heart of § 7's protection might have been
held pre-empted even though the union failed to take advantage of a fair opportunity to
invoke ULP jurisdiction. Likewise, the Court might not be as quick to find pre-emption if
the employer had some alternative other than a state court suit available.
45. 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
46. Id. at 682. The Court distinguished Sears, Roebuck & Co. on this basis because the
state concern with the picketing location in Sears did not affect the federal inquiry into
picketing objectives. Id. at 682-83.
47. Jones, 460 U.S. at 676.
48. Id. at 684.
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the heart of Garmon pre-emption remains the balancing of state and federal
interests.
C. The Morton/Machinists Pre-emption Doctrine
Garmon is not the alpha and omega of federal labor law pre-emption
under the NLRA and its amendments. It involves only pre-emption by
unfair labor practice provisions. In addition, there has arisen a doctrine
providing for federal pre-emption when state regulation would interfere with
federal labor policy.
In the same year that it decided Garmon, the Supreme Court sowed
the seeds of a second pre-emption doctrine in International Bhd. of Teams-
ters, Local 24 v. Oliver.49 Oliver held pre-empted a state antitrust statute
as applied to trailer rental rates negotiated between truck lines and the
TeamstersA0 Oliver recognized that the NLRA's pre-emptive force applied
not only to the unfair labor practice provisions and their penumbras, but
also to the relationship established by the Act between employers and
certified bargaining representatives. 51 The Court in Oliver also made clear
that here, as with Garmon pre-emption, the primary focus must be on the
conduct regulated and the impact of the state regulation upon federal labor
law policy, not on the state's reason for regulating the conduct. The Court
expressly disregarded the fact that the state law was an "antitrust law,
'
"52
as opposed to a "labor law."
In Teamsters, Local 20 v. Morton" the Supreme Court distinguished
Garmon pre-emption from the pre-emption suggested in Oliver. The Court
held in Morton that a district court could not permit, pursuant to pendent
jurisdiction, an award of damages for a union's violation of a state law
prohibiting peaceful persuasion tactics aimed at the struck employer's cus-
tomer. The Court reasoned that section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 54 in prohibiting only secondary persuasion of employees,
occupied the field and struck a balance of power that would be frustrated
if activity not reached by § 303 were prohibited by the states. The Court's
inquiry was not simply whether the conduct was "arguably protected" or
"arguably prohibited," but whether state law "would operate to frustrate
the purpose of the federal regulation. ' 55 The Court concluded that if there
were no pre-emption, "the inevitable result would be to frustrate the
congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and
49. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
50. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296-97. But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105
S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
51. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 297. The court in Oliver defined exceptions to the new pre-
emption doctrine, suggesting exception for state safety and health regulations. Id.
52. Id. at 297.
53. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 188 (1982).
55. 377 U.S. at 258.
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to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in
our national labor policy." ' 16 Morton continues the new version of pre-
emption first established in the labor field in Oliver and makes clear that
Garmon has no application in this area5 7 and establishes that the new form
of pre-emption was equally as important as Garmon pre-emption.5 8
International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n,5 9 held pre-empted a state agency's order prohibiting
union members from refusing to work overtime to pressure their employer
during post-contractual negotiations even though the NLRB's Regional
Director had dismissed the employer's unfair labor practice charge before
the state agency issued the order. Relying upon Morton and upon NLRB
v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union,60 the Court found that Morton recognized
a form of pre-emption distinct from Garmon61 and that, by analogy to
Insurance Agents Int'l Union, this Morton pre-emption applied to protect
from state regulation the economic weapons not "arguably protected" nor
"arguably prohibited" by the NLRA because congressional labor policy
intended that such weapons be left available to the parties. 62 The Court
reversed International Union of United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, which had reached a contrary conclusion in the
context of a partial strike.
International Ass'n of Machinists confirmed the distinctive nature of
Morton pre-emption from Garmon pre-emption, making clear that federal
labor policy, and not merely matters arguably protected or arguably pro-
hibited by express NLRA provisions, would be protected from state regu-
lation. International Ass'n of Machinists, however, like Morton, failed to
delineate for this type of pre-emption the kind of identifiable exceptions
56. Id. at 259-60.
57. See id. at 259-60; see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1967).
58. See 377 U.S. at 260 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953)).
59. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
60. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
61. See Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 488-89.
62. The Court in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Comm'n
made clear that parties were to have economic leverage:
Our decisions hold that Congress meant that these activities, whether of employer
or employees, were not to be regulable by States any more than by the N.L.R.B.
for neither States nor the Board is 'afforded flexibility in picking and choosing
which economic devices of labor and management shall be branded as unlawful,'
Ibid. Rather, both are without authority to attempt to 'introduce some standard of
properly "balanced" bargaining power,' id. at 497 (footnote omitted), or to define
'what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an "ideal" or
"balanced" state of collective bargaining.' Id. at 500 .... To sanction state regu-
lation of such economic pressure deemed by the federal Act 'desirabl[e]... is not
merely [to fill] a gap [by] outlaw[ing] what federal law falls to outlaw; it is denying
one party to an economic contest a weapon that Congress meant him to have
available.'
427 U.S. at 149-50 (quoting 361 U.S. at 497, 498, 500); Lesnick, Pre-emption Reconsidered:
The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLum. L. REv. 469, 478 (1972).
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from pre-emption that the Court had developed in Garmon and its progeny,
and failed to indicate, as had Garmon progeny cases, whether Oliver's
description of exceptions was still controlling.
Applying the International Ass'n of Machinists analysis, the Court in
Malone v. White Motor Corp. 3 rejected an employer's pre-ERISA challenge
to a state pension statute that affected the vesting rights and the employer's
termination obligations under a collectively-bargained pension plan. The
Court held that it would not find the state law pre-empted "unless it
conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless
the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress
sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States." 64 Finding that
nothing foreclosed all state regulation of matters subject to a collective
bargaining agreement, the Court declared that it must affirmatively imply
from the labor laws intent to pre-empt. 65 Here, the Court discovered no
basis for implying an attempt to pre-empt because the pre-ERISA federal
Pension Plan Disclosure Act's "savings clause" expressly preserved state
regulation of pension plans, and its legislative history demonstrated that
Congress was aware, in enacting this clause, that pension plans frequently
resulted from collective bargaining.66 Malone makes clear that just becatlse
a matter is the subject of a collective bargaining agreement does not
immunize the matter from state regulation even if state regulation were to
modify the agreement's terms and obligations, 67 that Morton pre-emption
must be capable of implication from federal labor statutes, 68 and that
Congress, by means of a savings clause, could preserve state regulation
from such pre-emption.
69
In New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 70 the
Court in a split decision held that a state law authorizing unemployment
benefits to strikers was not pre-empted. New York Telephone Co. is
important because a majority of the justices, writing separately, made clear
that there continues to exist a theory of pre-emption under Morton and
International Ass'n of Machinists that is separate and distinct from the pre-
emption theory under Garmon.71 However, the plurality's application of
Garmon's "deeply rooted in local feelings" exception in this wholly-inap-
propriate setting continued the confusion over the nature of exceptions to
the Morton/Machinists/Malone pre-emption doctrine and the continued
viability of Oliver as a complete statement of exceptions to Morton!
Machinists/Malone,72 and the plurality's distinction between laws of general
63. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
64. Malone, 435 U.S. at 504.
65. Id. at 504-05.
66. Id. at 507-10.
67. Id. at 504-05.
68. Id. at 505.
69. Id. at 513.
70. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
71. Id. at 533-40.
72. Id. at 540-46.
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application and state labor laws is particularly troubling, as even Garmon
has expressly rejected such a distinction.
7 3
This line of cases makes three things clear. First, federal lalbor pre-
emption is not limited to Garmon. In addition, state regulation of matters
not "arguably protected" nor "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA never-
theless may be pre-empted if such regulation frustrates a federal policy.
Just as Garmon pre-emption protects the forum chosen by Congress to
adjudicate unfair labor practices, the Morton/Machinists/Malone doctrine
protects relationships established by federal labor law. Second, the excep-
tions to this kind of pre-emption are not as clear as the exceptions to
Garmon pre-emption, thus encouraging the borrowing of Garmon exceptions
in a context for which they are not suited. Third, in order to find this type
of pre-emption, there must be some affirmative legislative declaration. In
short, just as Garmon protects the forum chosen by Congress to adjudicate
unfair labor practices, this type of pre-emption protects from state inter-
ference the relationships established by federal labor law. Because the
contours of these relationships are defined by implication, and not, like
Garmon, by express statutory provisions, however, the process of establish-
ing what is and what is not covered is fundamentally different from
determining coverage under Garmon.
D. Arbitration
Federal labor policy places a high premium on preserving the effective-
ness of collectively-negotiated grievance procedures culminating in binding
arbitration. As recognized by the Court in United Steel Workers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 4 the "collective-bargaining agreement
is an effort to erect a system of industrial self government" 75 and the
"grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very
heart of the system." 7 6 Preserving the finality of arbitration from state
intrusion, however, creates peculiar pre-emption problems.
The Supreme Court has consistently applied the Morton/Machinists!
Malone pre-emption doctrine in ascertaining whether the federal policy
favoring arbitration pre-empts a particular state claim. As Malone makes
clear, this doctrine requires an affirmative legislative declaration in order
to find pre-emption. The only statutory basis for such pre-emption based
on the federal policy favoring arbitration, however, is a general policy
73. See id. at 546 (Brennan, J., concurring), 547 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring); cf. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243, 246-47 (expressly rejecting the distinction between
law of general applicability and those of applicability only to labor relations). The concurring
justices adopted the second rationale because they found it consistent with International Ass'n
of Machinists. See New York Telephone Co., 440 U.S. at 549, 551 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Marshall, J., concurring).
74. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
75. Id. at 580.
76. Id. at 581.
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declaration in section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared
to be desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment." ' 77 The only other provision bearing on this issue is section 301 of
the LMRA, which is the general provision for suits "for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployee in an industry affecting commerce." '78 The legislative history of
neither § 203(d) nor § 301 is helpful. Thus, the policy favoring arbitration
relies heavily upon Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statutory pro-
visions discussed, above.
1. The Policy Favoring Arbitration
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,79 held
that section 301 supported issuance of an injunction compelling an employ-
er's specific performance of a binding arbitration clause because section 301
authorizes the creation of federal contract law permitting enforcement in
federal court,80 because section 301's legislative history reflects a congres-
sional intent to enforce arbitration clauses specifically, and because past
Railway Labor Act and NLRA decisions recognizing Norris-LaGuardia Act
exceptions also warrant recognizing an exception for injunctions enforcing
arbitration clauses under section 301.81 Textile Workers Union of America
is important to arbitral pre-emption because it lays the foundation for the
creation of a basis for federal law from which to infer pre-emption of state
claims that could interfere with the grievance and arbitration procedure.
The three most important cases in fashioning the federal policy favoring
arbitration are called collectively the Steel Workers trilogy.2 The Steel Workers
trilogy established binding arbitration as the preferred method under federal
law of resolving employer-employee disputes. Stated differently, just as Con-
gress, in the Garmon context, designated the NLRB as its chosen forum to
resolve unfair labor practices, Congress empowered employers and unions to
designate an arbitrator as the chosen forum to resolve disputes arising in con-
nection with the collective bargaining agreement.
United Steel Workers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 83 the first of
the Steel Workers trilogy, held for a union in its suit to compel arbitration
of its grievance under a seniority selection provision concerning an employee
77. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
79. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
80. 353 U.S. at 451, 456.
81. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
82. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
83. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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who was the subject of a workers' compensation settlement. 4 The Court
reasoned that section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act estab-
lished a policy favoring private resolution of employment disputes which
restricted court involvement to the limited role of making a determination
of "whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face
is governed by the contract." '85 American Mfg. Co. involved a dispute over
a specific contract provision.
6
Granting the union an order requiring arbitration, United Steel Workers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,17 held that management
rights language declaring that "matters which are strictly a function of
management shall not be subject to arbitration" did not, without more,
remove the subcontracting of unit work issue from an arbitration clause
governing "differences ... as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this Agreement, . . . [including] any local trouble of any
kind.''88 The Court did not deem such general management rights language
sufficient to overcome the presumption favoring arbitrability. 9 The Court
gave labor arbitration a special place, recognizing that it, unlike commercial
arbitration, was a substitute for industrial strife and not merely a substitute
for litigation.90 Accordingly, the Court declared that it would not deny
arbitration "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute"
and made clear that it would resolve all doubts in favor of coverage. 91
Throughout its opinion the Court stressed the "superior expertise" of the
labor arbitrator over the judge in resolving employment matters. 92
The third Trilogy case, United Steel Workers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 91 enforced an arbitration award reinstating a discharged
employee and granted backpay beyond the agreement's expiration date. As
in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court here stressed that the pre-
sumption was in favor of arbitrability. Beyond Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., the Court declared that mere ambiguity was not enough to set aside
an arbitration award, and that an arbitrator need not explain the reasons
for his or her decision. 94
Finally, following the Steel Workers trilogy, the Supreme Court in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n,9' gave the federal policy favoring arbitration that was
84. Id. at 569.
85. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568.
86. Id. at 569.
87. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
88. Id. at 576.
89. Id. at 582-83.
90. Id. at 578.
91. Id. at 582-83. However, it left arbitrability as a judicial inquiry. See id. at 583 n.7.
92. Id. at 582; see also American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567.
93. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
94. Id. at 598.
95. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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created in the Steelworkers Trilogy a position beside the express NLRA
unfair labor practice provisions. In holding that section 8(a)(3)'s arguable pro-
tection of activity did not, under Garmon, prevent an employee from bring-
ing a section 301 action in state court against an employer who breached a
nondiscrimination clause, the Court in Smith made clear that the unfair labor
practice provisions did not prevent a union from bringing a § 301 action to
vindicate an individual employee's rights under the contract.
9 6
The doctrine of arbitral pre-emption that emerged from the Steelwork-
ers' trilogy, although based on Morton/Machinists/Malone, had some of
the features of Garmon pre-emption. Arbitral pre-emption, like other forms
of Morton/Machinists/Malone pre-emption, protected a relationship arising
from the implications of federal labor law. It protected the relationship
between the parties establishing their own system of industrial self-govern-
ment through the collective bargaining agreement because it guaranteed
finality to disputes resolved by a "bargained-for" mechanism. Because of
the nature of the relationship, however, the protection provided resembled
Garmon's protection. Just as Garmon recognized the NLRB as the exclusive
forum for the resolution of unfair labor practice cases, arbitral pre-emption
recognized the grievance and arbitration procedure as the exclusive forum
for the resolution of disputes arising in the work place in connection with
the collective bargaining agreement. Just as Garmon had the express unfair
labor practice provisions as its guide, arbitral pre-emption was guided by
the express provisions of the parties' collective agreement. Just as Garmon
reached penumbral matters "arguably" protected or prohibited by unfair
labor practice statutory provisions, arbitral pre-emption reached matters
"arguably" covered by the grievance and arbitration procedure, absent an
express contractual exception. Therefore, while not controlling arbitral pre-
emption, Garmon and its progeny provided courts with a well-stocked body
of law from which courts could analogize in defining arbitral pre-emption's
parameters.
Arbitral pre-emption differed from Garmon pre-emption, however, in
an important respect. Garmon pre-emption involved the pre-emptive strength
of specific statutory provisions, while arbitral pre-emption, like other forms
of Morton/Machinists/Malone pre-emption, involved the pre-emptive scope
of a relationship. Congress drafted the precise language from which Garmon
pre-emption arose. In the case of arbitral pre-emption, Congress simply
ordained the relationship, and left it to the parties, by agreement, and the
courts, by scrutiny of that agreement, to define the scope of pre-emption.
This difference, coupled with the fact that the Court had not defined the
exceptions to arbitral pre-emption with the same precision as it had used
in defining the exceptions to Garmon pre-emption, invited lower courts to
apply the exemptions fashioned in Garmon and its progeny to the delicate
balance struck by arbitral pre-emption. This would prove to be a serious
96. Id. at 197-200.
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error, as Garmon exceptions, designed to strike a balance between federal
statutes and state statutes and common law, were not suited for arbitral
pre-emption, a form of Morton/Machinists/Malone pre-emption designed
to protect the operation of a federally-approved relationship from state
interference.
2. State Courts and the Federal Policy
Favoring Arbitration
Inevitably, the judicially-created federal policy favoring arbitration had
to come into conflict with state claims. A series of Supreme Court decisions
made clear that as with the NLRA unfair labor practice provisions under
Garmon, the federal law must prevail when it conflicts with state law.
In Teamsters of America, Local 124 v. Lucas Flour Co.,97 in affirming
a state court damages award to an employer for a union's strike over a
matter subject to arbitration, the Court held that the threat of disruption
to a collective bargaining agreement's negotiation and administration man-
dated that state courts apply federal law in resolving section 301 actions. 98
The Court further held that federal law warranted finding a violation when,
as here, the union struck over a matter within the scope of a final and
binding arbitration clause even if the collective agreement did not have an
express "no strike clause." 99
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,0 the Court faced directly the issue
of federal arbitral pre-emption versus state law. In holding that an employ-
er's failure to use the grievance and arbitration procedure precluded a state
court suit for severance pay under the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court emphasized that allowing the employee to sidestep the grievance and
arbitration procedure would frustrate employer and union efforts to establish
a uniform method for dispute resolution.' 0' The Court further noted that
the claim asserted and the relief sought were not unlike what was typical
of arbitration, 02 and that there was no suggestion that the plaintiff was
prevented by the circumstances from using the grievance procedure. 03
The Court offered a four-part rationale for its holding in Maddox.
First, the Court noted that federal labor policy generally requires that the
employee "attempt" to use the grievance and arbitration procedure in order
to assert contract grievances in court.0 4 Second, the Court noted that section
203(d) of the LMRA expressed a preference for private resolution of
employment disputes, and that allowing circumvention of the grievance and
97. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
98. Id. at 102-103.
99. Id. at 105-06.
100. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
101. Id. at 653.
102. Id. at 656.
103. Id. at 652-53.
104. Id. at 652.
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arbitration procedure would frustrate this policy.105 Third, the Court found
severance pay claims not unlike other grievances because the employees
remaining in the bargaining unit had a significant interest in the resolution
of disputes that occurred when one was terminated.' 6 Fourth, the Court
observed that the remedy provided by arbitration was not unlike that sought
by the plaintiff.1° The Court summarized its position in footnote 13, in
which it construed section 301's language as covering all "suits based on
contracts" between employers and unions and not only "contract suits"
between employers and unions.
10 8
Justice Black's dissent in Maddox is significant because it expresses
many concerns with this federal policy that courts have subsequently echoed
in declining to accord exclusivity to a grievance and arbitration remedy.
Finding the policy favoring arbitration simply to be the "brainchild of this
Court's recent consistently expressed preference for arbitration over litigation
in all types of cases,"'' 9 Justice Black contended that Congress had passed
no law authorizing this type of preference and expressed concern over its
constitutionality. 0 Most significantly, in contrast to the majority in Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., Justice Black outlined numerous ways in which
arbitration was a less effective means of fact-finding than a judicial pro-
ceeding, and complained that the majority's position effectively allowed
prospective waiver of judicial remedies that was not permitted in other
contexts."' As subsequent decisions illustrate, these specific concerns proved
prophetic.1
1 2
Maddox is an unconscious beginning to the doctrine of federal arbitral
pre-emption of state law. Although Maddox plainly is a pre-emption deci-
sion, it nowhere expresses itself as such. Rather, the language of the opinion
is of primary jurisdiction, purporting to require only that the employee go
to the arbitrator first."' Of course, under Lucas Flour's mandate that state
courts apply federal law in section 301 actions, together with the narrow
scope of review that the Steel Workers trilogy permitted after an arbitration,
requiring an exhaustion of arbitration prior to suit effectively would preclude
any subsequent state claim under the contract. However, Maddox never ex-
plored the breadth of this pre-emption, not once mentioning Morton or Garmon
and coming before International Ass'n of Machinists and Malone were decided.
Nor did Maddox discuss, as had Garmon, those situations that might be ex-
105. Id. at 653.
106. Id. at 656.
107. Id. at 657.
108. Id. at n.13.
109. Id. at 662-63 (Black, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 664-65.
112. See infra notes 140-45, 183-86 and accompanying text.
113. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652.
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cepted from arbitration preemption. After Maddox, therefore, the precise
parameters of doctrine remained largely undefined.
3. The Development of Exceptions
Prior to Allis-Chalmers, no Supreme Court case clearly delineated under
what circumstances a state claim, although within the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement grievance and arbitration clause, nevertheless would
survive pre-emption. The result was that state and lower federal courts
borrowed haphazardly from the Garmon exceptions in order to justify
decisions finding no pre-emption of state law. There was, however, consid-
erable attention paid to the circumstances under federal law that would
dictate finding no arbitral pre-emption, and it is to these circumstances that
we now turn.
a. the Alexander exception
The first exception is described as the "Alexander exception" taking its
name from the Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,"
4
which held that an arbitrator's prior finding in an employer's favor on a
race discrimination grievance did not preclude a subsequent Title VII suit."5
The Supreme Court has applied this exception to find that neither the
availability nor the exercise of a grievance and arbitration procedure prevents
subsequent actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)"6 nor those
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.1 7 In addition, lower federal courts have
applied this doctrine to numerous other federal protective statutes." 8 Alex-
ander mandates that these actions be preserved independent of the arbitra-
tion, and that courts neither hold arbitration preclusive of such actions nor
even defer to arbitration as would the NLRB under Smith in an unfair
labor practice case.
The rationale supporting Alexander has little to recommend it. It is rife
with inconsistencies, and it has misled numerous state courts into applying
its principles to preserve from pre-emption various state claims based upon
state statutes or policies." 9
In Alexander, the Court held that neither the election of remedies
doctrine nor waiver nor arbitral deferral precluded a black employee covered
by a collective bargaining agreement containing anti-discrimination and
arbitration provisions from bringing a Title VII action after challenging his
discharge unsuccessfully through the grievance and arbitration procedure. 20
114. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
115. Id. at 59-60.
116. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
117. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
118. See generally Fowler, Arbitration, the Triology, and Individual Rights: Developments
Since Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 36 LAB. L.J. 173 (1985).
119. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
120. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47, 49-51.
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The Court reasoned that election of remedies did not preclude the subsequent
Title VII action because provisions giving courts de novo power even after
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) determination
demonstrated that Congress intended the federal courts to have authority
independent of other forums to entertain Title VII claims."' Furthermore,
the Court reasoned that the general intent to allow Title VII as a remedy
independent of other federal statutory actions compelled this conclusion.'2
The Court rejected the doctrine of waiver because collective agreements in
the arbitration "concern[ed] . . . majoritarian processes" while Title VII
involved "an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. '1 2 3 Fi-
nally the Court found that deferral to arbitration was not feasible because
the arbitral fact-finding process was inferior to the judicial fact-finding
process.' 24
Serious flaws in the Court's rationale demonstrate the absurdity of this
result. The argument that courts are entitled to make determinations inde-
pendent of the arbitrator because they can make determinations independent
of the EEOC ignores the fact that the federal policy favoring arbitration
enjoyed parity with NLRA provisions under Smith, and Title VII nowhere
indicates an intent to exalt its policies over the federal policy favoring
arbitration. Moreover, the Court reached this decision in Smith even though
Smith, like Alexander, involved a statutory prohibition of discrimination.1
Also, recent Court decisions according state agency determinations increasing
res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in subsequent federal court actions
undercut the persuasiveness of the Alexander analogy. 126 The argument that
other federal actions are independent of Title VII holds no weight when
the NLRA, the most analogous statutory situation previously addressed by
the Court, calls for deferral to arbitration. The contention that Title VII,
unlike the collective bargaining agreement and arbitration, involves individ-
ual rights rather than majoritarian processes begs the question; if the
contract contains an anti-discrimination clause, it protects the same individ-
ual rights as Title VII.127 If the union failed to carry out its duty of fair
representation, then the employee would have a cause of action under
federal law for breach of the duty of fair representation, 28 After all, this
121. Id. at 45, 47-49.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 51.
124. Id. at 56-57.
125. Smith involved § 8(a)(3), which prohibits discrimination against an employee for
engaging in, or refusing to engage in, protected activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Alexander involved Title VII, which prohibits discrimination because of race, sex, religion, or
national origin. See 29 U.S.C, § 2000e (1982).
126. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-59; cf., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,
664-65 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing against federal pre-emption policy on grounds
that arbitral process was inferior fact finding process to judicial procedures).
127. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
128. Moreover, numerous past Supreme Court decisions rejected the precise distinction




duty arose in the context of race discrimination long before Title VII was
enacted.129
Progeny cases have fared no better. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 130 the Court held that a binding arbitration clause and
an arbitrator's prior construction of the contract's language providing drivers
with compensation "for all time spent in the service of the Employer" as
not including pre-trip inspection and transportation time did not preclude
drivers from bringing subsequently an FLSA claim seeking compensation
for pre-trip inspection and transportation time because "statute[s] designed
to provide minimum substantive guarantees" are not suited for resolution
by arbitration. 131 The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme granted
rights of action to individuals that could be neither waived nor limited by
a collective bargaining agreement; 32 that unions focused on maximizing
overall compensation in processing grievances, and could act in good faith
to decline to process some individual grievances despite the breach of FLSA
rights; 133 that arbitrators may lack familiarity with FLSA principles134 or be
prevented by the collective bargaining agreement from following them; 135
and that arbitrators may be unable to grant relief available under FLSA. 36
These four justifications are makeweight arguments. If the arbitrator's
judgment was what was bargained for and if employees bargained for that
judgment to extend to pay matters, they cannot complain that their chosen
forum is less familiar than a court with the FLSA. Moreover, whether or
not an employee had greater relief available from a court than from an
arbitrator was a factor found irrelevant in many past decisions. 13
7
McDonald v. City of West Branch,"'3 in holding a police officer's prior
arbitration concerning his discharge did not have collateral estoppel or res
judicata effect in his subsequent section 1983 action claiming he was
discharged for exercising First Amendment rights, reasoned, first that Kre-
mer v. Chemical Construction Corp.139 made clear that 28 U.S.C. section
1738 did not require federal courts to give claim preclusion or issue preclu-
sion effect to arbitration awards, and, second, that Alexander and Barrentine
exposed shortcomings in the arbitration process's ability to vindicate the
individual employee's statutory rights that prevented federal courts from
choosing to accord a prior arbitration such effect.14'
129. Steele v. Louisville & N. Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
130. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
131. Barrantine, 450 U.S. at 731 n. 3 & 737.
132. Id. at 739.
133. Id. at 742.
134. Id. at 743.
135. Id. at 744.
136. Id. at 745.
137. See, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47
(1959). But see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 656 (1965).
138. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
139. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
140. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288-89; see Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477-78.
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The Court offered four reasons why arbitration is inadequate to allow
such preclusive effect. First, the Court emphasized that here, as in Alex-
ander, the arbitrators lacked expertise in handling "the complex legal
questions that arise in section 1983 actions.' ' 41 Second, the Court declared
that the contract unduly confines the arbitrator because it may not give the
arbitrator sufficient authority to enforce § 1983 and because the arbitrator
must follow the contract if there is a conflict with section 1983.142 Third,
the Court expressed concern that the interest of the union in charge of
processing grievances may conflict with that of the individual employee.
43
Finally, and most significantly, the Court found that arbitral fact-finding
was not an adequate substitute for the judicial fact-finding anticipated by
Congress in creating section 1983.144
None of these reasons has merit. The first three raise irrelevant concerns.
The ability to handle fact questions is all that is required; the arbitrator
need not be an expert in section 1983 actions in order to determine whether
a police officer was fired for speaking his mind or for some other reason.
The scope of the arbitrator's authority likewise is a non-issue, as the
arbitrator will not be capable of making a determination that would satisfy
the elements of collateral estoppel or res judicata in a subsequent section
1983 action unless the contract actually covers the subject of the subsequent
section 1983 action. Moreover, it is the arbitrator's factual determination,
not the significance attached to it, that will be given preclusive effect.
Finally, it'is the arbitrator's determination for which the employee bar-
gained; the employee was free to bargain for exclusion of matters that could
be the subject of section 1983 actions.
The potential union conflict likewise is a non-issue; if the union treats
the employee unfairly, his or her remedy is a duty of fair representation
action. If the union chooses in good faith not to take the employee's claim
to arbitration, there can be no collateral estoppel or res judicata effect
because there was no issue actually litigated and no opportunity to litigate;
14
and, again, this risk is what the employee bargained for when he chose the
union as his representative.
The remaining concern, the reliability of the fact-finding process, rep-
resents a flip-flop from Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., and an alignment
with the concerns expressed by Justice Black in his dissent to Maddox. If
the Court rejected it in Maddox, it is unclear why this contention was
accepted in McDonald. It appears only that McDonald continues the illog-
ical, inexplicable insistence of the Court on in-court adjudication of facts
connected with certain "red-circled" statutory actions.
141. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290.
142. Id. at 290-91.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Of course such a regulation could preclude a subsequent action under principles
of waiver, or accord and satisfaction, or compromise and settlement.
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b. the duty of fair representation exception
The federal policy favoring exclusive resolution of employment disputes
'through agreements in arbitration presumes that the union will attempt
fairly to represent the employees. Otherwise, the policy would not succeed
in its aim to minimize industrial strife. Accordingly, there must be an
exception to arbitral finality when an employee has proved a breach of the
duty of fair representation.
The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes'4 first created the duty of fair
representation in the NLRA context. There, in reversing a jury verdict for
an employee in his suit against the employer and the union because the
employer discharged him for being medically unfit and the union chose not
to arbitrate the claim, the Court held that Garmon did not pre-empt the
action because Garmon did not apply to section 301 suits.1 47 It reversed
nevertheless because the employer had not repudiated the agreement and
the mere fact that the union reached a different evaluation of the grievance
than a jury did not mean that the union acted arbitrarily or otherwise
reached the duty of fair representation.
4
The Court discussed two situations in which there would be an exception
to the Maddox exhaustion requirement. First, an employee would be
excused from exhausting grievance and arbitration procedures when the
employer repudiates the grievance and arbitration procedure by its con-
duct. 49 Second, the employee is excused when the union has sole respon-
sibility for arbitration and breaches its duty of fair representation, 50 by
acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith manner, 15 but not simply
by either merely refusing to arbitrate, 5 2 or making an error.'53
The Court further clarified the duty of fair representation exception in
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.154 In a hybrid duty of fair represen-
tation/section 301 suit involving the discharge of employees for falsifying
expense vouchers, the Court held that "enforcement of the finality provision
where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union's having
satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection
with the arbitration proceedings."' 55 The Court declared that the focus
following arbitration must be upon whether there is substantial reason to
believe that a union's breach of the duty contributed to the erroneous
outcome of the contractual proceedings.
146. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
147. Id. at 183-84.
148. Id. at 192-95.
149. Id. at 185-86.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 190.
152. Id. at 192.
153. Id. at 193-95.
154. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
155. Id. at 571.
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c. summary
The Alexander doctrine and the duty of fair representation doctrine
have been the only exceptions to the doctrine of arbitral pre-emption
expressly created by the Supreme Court. From Oliver and New York Tel.
Co. (Morton/Machinists/Malone decisions that did not involve arbitration), one
could expect that state courts and lower federal courts would limit implied
exceptions to state health and safety laws and benefits under workers'
compensation and unemployment compensation laws. However, the Court's
failure to deal comprehensively with the precise parameters of arbitral pre-
emption, coupled with the flaws in the Alexander doctrine, caused numerous
state and lower federal courts prior to Allis-Chalmers to create haphazard
exceptions of their own.
II. ARBITRAL PRE-EMPTION IN THE LowE, COURTS PRIOR
TO ALLIS-CHALMERS
The nature and scope of arbitral pre-emption was uncertain prior to
Allis-Chalmers. It was unclear whether arbitral pre-emption was an affirm-
ative defense or whether it affected subject matter jurisdiction. Regarding
the scope, state and lower federal courts frequently unduly restricted the
doctrine, principally by misusing Garmon criteria, or by applying the
Alexander exception to state causes of action.
A. Nature of Arbitral Pre-emption
If only an affirmative defense, arbitral pre-emption would be waived
unless pleaded; if subject matter jurisdiction, it could be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. If only an affirmative defense, arbitral pre-emption could
not provide the basis for removal, which turns on the contents of the well-
pleaded complaint; if subject matter jurisdiction, of course, arbitral pre-
emption would necessarily provide a basis for removal.
56
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers 57 should have put the problem to rest when it held that
a state law injunction action'could be removed to federal court based upon
defendant's characterization of plaintiff's claim of arising under section
301.158 Most lower federal courts viewed Avco as dispositive of the pleading
issue as well as the removal issue. 5 9 The same was true of most state
156. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12-14
(1983).
157. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
158. Id. at 560-61; see Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-24.
159. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984);




courts.' 6 0 Alabama's Supreme Court, however, adopted the opposite position
in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis.16' In an analogous context,
the court in Longshoremen held that Garmon pre-emption was an affirm-
ative defense that can be waived if not pleaded. The court drew a distinction
between the court's subject matter jurisdiction and the court's power to
act. 6 This indicated that arbitral pre-emption would receive similar treat-
ment. Thus, before Allis-Chalmers, the courts were split over whether
arbitral pre-emption was an affirmative defense or whether arbitral pre-
emption divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Scope of Arbitral Pre-emption
Unlike the clear delineation of Garmon pre-emption in the Garmon
decision and its progeny, the Supreme Court decisions prior to Allis-
Chalmers offered very little guidance about the parameters of the arbitral
pre-emption doctrine as derived from Machinists, the United Steelworkers
of America Trilogy, and Maddox. The lower courts, in attempting to fill
in the blanks, frequently became confused. There are four ways in which
to evaluate lower court views on the scope of arbitral pre-emption of state
law claims prior to Allis-Chalmers: according to Supreme Court pre-emption
decisions chosen as the basis for its rationale, according to what state claims
were involved, according to whether state claims under consideration were
filed before or after arbitration, and finally, according to whether the
defendant was a party other than the employer itself.
As for basis evaluation, all such cases in theory should rest upon
Morton/Machinists/Maddox rather than upon Garmon/Linn/Farmer. Ar-
bitral pre-emption rests upon the federal policy favoring preservation of a
mechanism for private resolution of employment disputes, not upon what
express NLRA language arguably prohibits or arguably protects. All arbitral
pre-emption cases in theory should not except from pre-emption any oth-
erwise pre-empted claims unless, under Vaca, the employer has repudiated
the collective bargaining agreement or the union has breached the duty of
fair representation, or, under Alexander/Barrentine/McDonald, the claim
involved some federal statutory right intended to be a remedy preserved in
addition to arbitration.
Concerning evaluation by claim, Maddox and the Steel Workers
trilogy in theory extend arbitral pre-emption to any claim arguably covered
by the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause. Nevertheless, deci-
sions prior to Allis-Chalmers by state and lower courts involving arbitral pre-
emption place greater emphasis upon the nature of the state claim involved
160. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local
16, 69 CaI.2d 713, 447 P.2d 325, 73 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1968); Chicago and North Western Ry.
Co. v. La Follette, 27 Wis.2d 505, 135 N.W.2d 269 (1965); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n
v. Local Unions Nos. 542, 542-A and 542-B, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952).
161. 470 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 380 (1986).
162. Id. at 1216.
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and the comparative adequacy of the remedies, without regard to whether
a binding arbitration clause actually covered the matter.
Whether the claim had been raised before or after the processing of
the grievance to arbitration should not have mattered under the Steel Workers
trilogy and Maddox because Maddox dictated that an employee at least at-
tempt to arbitrate the grievance before resorting to the courts, and the Steel
Workers trilogy permitted only the most perfunctory review by the courts
of matters decided by the arbitrator. With regard to claims against defendants
other than employers, what happened, for example, if the employee brought
a fraud claim against both the employer and an individual superivsory
employee? What happened if the insurance company retained to provide
benefits granted by the collective bargaining agreement was named as a defen-
dant with the employer? Would arbitral pre-emption protect the employer but
not the supervisory employee or the insurer? The Supreme Court had given
no guidance.
1. According to Basis
Decisions prior to Allis-Chalmers declining to find a state claim pre-
empted by the federal policy favoring private resolution of employment
disputes most frequently relied upon a combination of Garmon/Linni
Farmer and Alexander/Barrentine/McDonald, or upon Garmon/LinniFarmer
alone. The Garmon/LinniFarmer rationale did not fit arbitral pre-emption,
but, if applied, ran the risk of destroying the arbitral pre-emption doctrine
entirely. Garmon commanded the court to look to whether specific language
arguably protected or arguably prohibited certain conduct. There was no
language in the NLRA that clearly established a grievance and arbitration
clause as an employee's exclusive remedy. Accordingly, many decisions
would conclude, in balancing federal interest and state interest under Gar-
mon, that the matter covered by the arbitration clause was something of
only peripheral concern to the labor laws while the state tort involved was
a matter deeply rooted in local interest and therefore not pre-empted. In
those decisions in which Alexander/Barrentine/McDonald played a role, the
court would find no pre-emption because it would determine that just as
certain federal statutes guaranteed remedies for individual rights independent
of an arbitration clause, certain state statutes and/or policies also provided
independent remedies. If the particular tort claim qualified, in the court's
view, as a independent claim, the tort was not pre-empted.
Peabody Galion v. Dollar163 represents the worst example of both errors,
combining a misinterpretation of Garmon and Farmer'64 with a misappli-
cation of Alexander 65 to preserve from pre-emption an employee's claim
163. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
164. Id. at 1314-15.
165. Id. at 1320-23.
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under a state statute prohibiting discharge for filing a workers' compensation
claim.'6 In Dollar, a dispute arose when an employer used a collective
bargaining provision allowing disability layoffs 67 to place an employee on
workers' compensation leave.' 6 Employees, after arbitrating unsuccessfully,
filed diversity actions under an Oklahoma statute prohibiting discharge for
filing a workers' compensation claim and providing the discharged employee
with a civil action for damages.
69
Citing the Vaca decision that held Garmon not applicable to arbitral
pre-emption, the Dollar court blindly posited the issue in Garmon terms as
whether "the state statute interfere[s] with the workings of the National
Labor Relations Act."' 170 The court concluded that Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
a Garmon progeny case, "seriously undermine[d] the appellees' argument
that the state statute is facially precluded by federal law" because Sears,
Roebuck & Co. held that a trespass claim was not pre-empted.' 7' Relying
on Garmon, the court committed the incredible blunder of finding that the
wrongful discharge claim was a matter of peripheral concern and was not
arguably protected nor arguably prohibited because it "has nothing what-
soever to do with union organization or collective bargaining.' ' 72 The court
then concluded that a balancing of interests warranted no pre-emption
because workers' compensation was very important to states, the statute in
question was a law of general application rather than a law applying only
to labor relations, and because it was not unlike the defamation action
allowed by the Supreme Court in Linn.
73
The Dollar court recognized that Morton established a separate line of
pre-emption, but concluded that the Morton doctrine did not pre-empt
because there was "no special congressional consideration of workmen's
compensation related discharges" and "discharging workers because they
had filed claims has nothing to do with collective bargaining.' 74 The specific
collective bargaining provision here did not warrant a different result, the
court concluded, because the source of the state tort claim was a state
statute and the Supreme Court in Barrentine and Alexander had held that
arbitration was not the exclusive remedy for individual statutory rights.175
This analysis is flawed in four respects. First, it applies Garmon in a
context that Garmon does not govern. 176 Second, by splitting Garmon into
166. Id. at 1323-24.
167. Id. at 1311 n.la.
168. Id. at 1311 n.5, 1312.
169. Id. at 1312 n.2.
170. Id. at 1313.
171. Id. at 1314.
172. Id. at 1316.
173. Id. at 1318.
174. Id. at 1316.
175. Id. at 1320-21.
176. Garmon involved pre-emption by ULP provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Dollar
concerned the pre-emptive impact of a dispute over the meaning of a collective bargaining
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a Garmon doctrine and a Sears, Roebuck & Co. doctrine, and by demon-
strating complete obliviousness to the importance of the federal policy
favoring arbitration, the court misapplied Garmon's factors to the case
before it. 177 Third, the court ignored the admonition of Maddox to focus
on the conduct (here, a discharge) rather than upon the state's reason for
regulating (here, furthering workers' compensation policies). 78 Finally, the
court ignored the difference between a state statute and a federal statute
for pre-emption purposes.1 79 Federal statutes and policies stand on equal
footing with each other and, unless their terms indicate otherwise, must be
reconciled; the Constitution's supremacy clause, however, makes plain that
this is not the case with federal law and state law.8 0 It made no sense for
the court to apply Alexander and Barrentine-cases accommodating two
conflicting federal policies-to the context in which the conflict was between
federal and state law. The tortured road that the court had to follow in
order to reach its decision should have suggested that the right answer lay
elsewhere; had it found pre-emption, the road would have been much easier.
The court should have begun with Morton/Machinists. The court should
have found, under Morton/Machinists, that the federal policy favoring
arbitration pre-empted state court actions on matters covered by an arbi-
tration clause unless the Vaca exception applied, in which case the federal
duty of fair representation law for the law under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act would govern. Applying this rule to the facts,
the court should have determined that the collective bargaining agreement
contained a binding arbitration provision covering all disputes under the
agreement, a matter of pre-emption by the grievance resolution relationship given quasi-judicial
status in the Steelworkers triology. Pre-emption by federal policy, as distinguished from pre-
emption by express provisions, is governed by Malone/Machinists. This makes a difference because
Garmon, intended to protect specific provisions, calls for a balancing of federal stautory language
with state policies embodied in common law torts or statutory claims. Morton/Machinists/Malone,
by contrast, calls for no such balancing because this preemption protects relationships arising
by implication. Any state interference with the smooth operation of those relationships would
frustrate the federal policy. The issue is not a balancing of interests, but whether the federal
relationship reaches or does not reach a particluar incident. To apply Garmon in this context
would frustrate federal policy because, as Dollar illustrates, the balancing would be done between
a clear state tort or statute and a federal relationship without any clear statutory language.
177. Properly applying Garmon to arbitration requires recognition of the importance of
the federal policy favoring arbitration. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
178. Peabody Galion, 666 F.2d at 1316.
179. Id. at 1323-24.
180. A conflict between two federal statutes involves a contest between equals. The law
avoids implied repeal of one in favor of another because, absent congressional direction to
the contrary, the courts presume that Congress intended to give effect to both statutes as far
as possible. See generally IA SurtERAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (1972 &
Supp. 1985). A conflict between a federal statute and a state statute, by contrast, is governed
b , the supremacy clause and considerations of federalism. Unless federalism dictates that state
law be preserved, the supremacy clause presumes that federal law displaces state law. See
generally id. at § 36.08.
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contract, that the contract contained clauses outlining the employer's right
to lay off and discharge, and that the arbitration had to take place. Finally,
the court should have engaged only in those narrow inquiries established
by the Steel Workers trilogy to determine if the arbitration proceeding was
fair and regular and if the duty of fair representation was satisfied. Unfor-
tunately, the court did not do this.'
Some courts, although choosing the Garmon analysis, avoided these
errors.8 2 Many cases other than Dollar made the mistake of applying
181. Other decisions erroneously applying Garmon/Farmer to arbitral pre-emption reached
similar results. In Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985), the court held not pre-empted a "whistle-blower's" public policy
wrongful discharge claim under California law because Garmon-progeny cases Farmer and
New York Telephone Co. held that the state had a significant interest in protecting public
policy. Id. at 1373-75. In addition, the Garibaldi court concluded that there would be no
interference with labor policy because the claim sounded in tort and not in contract. Id. at
1375. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis.2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), rev'd, 471 U.S.
202 (1985), held an employer's bad faith claim for interference with receipt of medical insurance
benefits was not pre-empted because it sounded in tort and not contract. Id. at 702-03.
Garmon, as interpreted by Farmer, made clear that bad faith actions were" 'a merely peripheral
concern of the Labor Management Relations Act.' " Id. at 704 (quoting Farmer v. Carpenter,
430 U.S. 290 (1977). Garmon also made clear that the state's interest in making sure insurance
claims are paid was an interest "deeply rooted in local feeling" and the state tort claim offered
more types of relief than arbitration. Id. at 706-07.
Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1057, 207 Cal. Rptr. 117,
121-22 (1984), held that a terminated employee's outrage claim against an employer was not
pre-empted because the NLRA, as amended, contained no express provision mandating
arbitration like the Railway Labor Act provision; Farmer and Garmon held that federal labor
law did not pre-empt outrage actions; and the fact that the claim sounded in tort rather than
contract precluded application of the Maddox exhaustion requirement. See Collins v. General
Time Corp., 549 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (court relied on Farmer in holding Alabama
outrage action not pre-empted); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611
P.2d 281, 287 (1980) (held that plaintiff whose grievance was pending at time of his state
claim was not prevented from bringing action under state statute prohibiting discharge for
filing workmen's compensation claim because statute, under Garmon, was " 'deeply rooted in
local feeling' ").
182. Although mistakenly choosing the Garmon analysis, the Eighth Circuit in Moore v.
General Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985),
held a fraud claim pre-empted by the failure to exhaust arbitration because the complained-
of conduct was arguably protected or prohibited by §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA because it
"essentially arises from an employment contract between [the employee] and GM that was
entered into pursuant to an agreement between GM and the Union." The court rejected the
contention that the conduct was "merely peripheral," reasoning that it "arises from a transfer
that was provided for generally in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and specifically, in
the Memorandum of Understanding between the Union and GM." Id. at 316. The court also
rejected another pitfall of applying Garmon to arbitral pre-emption, holding that no Garmon
exception applied because the "damages which Moore alleges she suffered were at least partially
a result of her personal reaction to the transfer" and the right infringed "evolves from the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding ... which is
governed by federal law, not state law." Id. Finally, the court rejected the contention that
any difference in remedies would prevent pre-emption, reasoning that the issue was " 'not the
nature of the remedy sought ... but whether the remedy sought may require that the court
19871
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Alexander/Barrentine/MeDonald to state statutory claims. 18 As with Gar-
mon, however, not all state courts presented with arguments by analogy to
Alexander fell into this trap. 8 4 Most frequently, decisions prior to Allis-
Chalmers that found pre-emption did not mention Garmon progeny or
Alexander progeny cases at all. Rather, they relied upon the Steel Workers
trilogy and Maddox.I8s Other decisions reached the correct result without citing
from which it is sought ... interpret a collective bargaining agreement.' " Id. at 217 (quoting
Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 380 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982)); see Wilkes-Barre Publishing, 647 F.2d at 381.
183. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, 105 Il1.2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 278 (1985) (held that employee's claim that he was discharged in violation
of state workmen's compensation statute was not pre-empted, reasoning that: it would be
anomalous if statute protected only employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements;
employee's arbitration remedy would be less attractive because he cannot recover punitive
damages; and that Alexander and its progeny hold that failure to arbitrate does not preclude
federal statutory remedies); Elia v. Industrial Personnel Corp. 125 Ill. App.3d 1026, 466
N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (1st Dist. 1984) (held that action for retaliatory discharge for filing
workmen's compensation claim was not precluded by prior adverse arbitration decision because
specific issue of retaliation was not raised in arbitration proceeding, because arbitrators "are,
at best, poorly equipped to enforce the public policy of this State" and because Alexander
and its progeny applied to state law actions); Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No.
190 v. Utility Trailer Sales Co., 141 Cal. App.3d 80, 82-83, 190 Cal. Rptr. 98, 100 (1983),
appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 1005 (1984) (court observed, in dicta by analogy to Alexander,
that arbitrator's decision would not foreclose employee from bringing state court action to
enforce his statutory right to reimbursement for lost tools). Numerous courts have held that
state claims under state anti-discrimination provisions survive federal arbitral pre-emption
because of Alexander. See Hayworth v. Oakland, 129 Cal. App.3d 723, 181 Cal. Rptr. 214
(1982); Weiss v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Mich. App. 519, 236 N.W.2d 124 (1975); Thornton v.
Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 462 A.2d 133 (1983).
184. Payne v. Pennzoil Corp., 138 Az. 52, 672 P.2d 1322 (1983) (holding that employee's
arbitration remedy was exclusive in that his action under state statute prohibiting discharge
for filing workers' compensation claim was pre-empted by collective bargaining agreement's
grievance and arbitration clause even though statute voided any preexisting contractual waiver
of rights that it conferred, correctly reasoning that Alexander and its progeny are limited to
federal rights and that state rights stand on different ground); Embry v. Pacific Stationery
and Printing Co., 62 Or. App. 113, 659 P.2d 436, 437 (1983) (limited Alexander only to
statutory actions, holding that plaintiff's failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration remedies
precluded him from bringing state wrongful discharge action under public policy theory,
because there was no independent statutory basis for the claim).
185. Redmond v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 633, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(held that contract, fraud, outrage, and bad faith claims were pre-empted because all derived
from plaintiff's layoff, and plaintiff had failed to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedure);
Kaferle v. Fredrick, 360 F.2d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 1966) (court, relying on Maddox, held
employee's suit for back wages for breach to collective bargaining agreement was pre-empted
because plaintiff had not grieved arbitrated dispute); Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d
12, 15-16 (6th Cir. 1965) (relying upon Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 15, held that
suit for disability pay under contract's disability pay clause was pre-empted); Henderson v.
Eastern Gas and Fuel Assocs., 290 F.2d 677, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1961) (court, relying upon
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 374 (1960), observed in dicta
that failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration remedies precluded suit for back wages on
contract); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1241, 1245-47 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
aff'd, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986) (held that claims
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Maddox or the Steel Workers trilogy. 18 6
2. According to Claim.
Wrongful discharge was perhaps the grayest area of controversy prior
to Allis-Chalmers, as the upswing in state law exceptions to the employment-
at-will rule provided protection that until recently had only been available
under a collective bargaining agreement's clause permitting discharge only
for "just cause." Relatively new actions for discharging in retaliation for
filing workers' compensation claims were most controversial. Courts holding
such actions not pre-empted generally relied on Alexander analysis. 187 Others
reached the same result based on Garmon.88 Courts adopting the opposite
view tended to reject Alexander analysis in the context of state statutory
rights. 8 9 Wrongful discharge claims based on the "public policy" theory
caused similar controversy. 9'
arising out of discharge of employees were pre-empted even though claims were not contract
claims because Warrior & Gulf Navigation and Maddox precluded any such claims when
plaintiffs had not exhausted grievance and arbitration procedure); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass
Mfg., 572 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985) (relying on
United Steelworkers of America Trilogy, held pre-empted plaintiff's action under state statute
for wrongful discharge for filing workmen's compensation claim); Frame v. B. F. Goodrich
Co., 453 F. Supp. 63, 65-66 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (relying upon Warrior & Gulf Navigation and
Enterprise Wheel and Car, held that suit for pension benefits was pre-empted because arbitration
clause provided exclusive remedy); Reese v. Mead Corp., 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,732 (N.D.
AiA. 1975) (held plaintiffs' fraud claims arising out of representatives made by employer
in connection with reduction in force was pre-empted because plaintiffs had not even
attempted to utilize grievance and arbitration procedure); Thompson v. Modernfold
Indus., 175 IND. App. 686, 373 N.E.2d 916, 919-20 (1978) (relying on Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, and Maddox, held wrongful discharge suit was pre-empted for failure to exhaust
arbitration); Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (relying
upon Maddox and Warrior & Gulf Navigation, held that prior arbitration precluded action
under state statute prohibiting discharges for filing workers' compensation claims).
186. Thus, Bertrand v. Quincy Market, 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,577 (D. Mass. 1983) held
a wrongful discharge claim based on the covenant of fair dealing theory was preempted because
the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his grievance and arbitration procedure. Hilliard v. Arco Steel
Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976), relying on Vaca, held that an employee whose discharge the Union grieved
but did not take to arbitration could not sue his employer for wrongful discharge without satisfy-
ing one of the Vaca exceptions.
187. See, e.g., Peabody Gallion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 1981); Elia
v. Industrial Personnel Corp., 125 Ill. App.3d 1026, 466 N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (1984).
188. See Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281, 287
(1980); see also Wyatt v. Jewel Co., 108 Ill. App.3d 840, 439 N.E. 2d 1053, 1054 (1982)
(workers' compensation discharge claim was held not pre-empted because it was tort claim).
189. See, e.g., Lamb v. Briggs, 700 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1983); Payne v. Pennzoil
Corp., 138 Ariz. 52, 672 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1983); Thompson v. Monsanto, 559 S.W.2d 873
(Tex. App. 1977). Compare Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985) (held"whistle blower's" wrongful discharge action
not pre-empted); Messenger v . Volkswagen of America, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. W.Va.
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The more traditional fraud claims attracted none of the controversy
that the wrongful discharge claims attracted. Prior to Allis-Chalmers, courts
reaching the issue held that when the fraud arose out of a matter subject
to the grievance and arbitration procedure, the fraud claim was pre-empted.'9,
Other new torts, such as outrage and bad faith, were the center of
controversy prior to Allis-Chalmers principally because lower courts were
frequently misled into applying Farmer analysis in the setting of arbitral
pre-emption. Farmer had held, under Garmon, that an outrage claim was
not pre-empted by section 8(b) of the NLRA. Decisions finding that griev-
ance and arbitration provisions did not pre-empt outrage and bad faith
claims within their scope tended to rely on Farmer.192 Decisions finding no
pre-emption either rejected the applicability of Farmer to arbitral pre-
emption'93 or held that the facts in this instance did not meet the Farmer
threshold. '94
Other than fraud, the areas in which there was very little controversy
before Allis-Chalmers are not surprising. The least controversial area in
which courts regularly found pre-emption involved contract claims. 95 Courts
frequently built upon J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,' 96 which held that collective
bargaining agreement supercedes the individual employment contracts of
bargaining unit employees.'9 In light of Alexander, the least controversial
area in which courts regularly found no pre-emption was state law discrim-
ination claims. 98
3. According to Time
In theory, whether the state court claims are before or after the
exhaustion of the grievance and arbitration procedure should not be a
1984) (held whistle blower's wrongful discharge action not pre-empted); with Embry v. Pacific
Stationery and Printing Co., 62 Or. App. 113, 659 P.2d 436, 437-38 (1983) (held public policy
wrongful discharge claim pre-empted because public policy had no statutory basis).
190. See supra notes 181, 184-89 and accompanying text.
191. Moore v. General Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
aff'd, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); Reese v. Mead
Corp., 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,732 (N.D. Ala. 1975); Collins v. MBPXL Corp., 9 Kan.
App.2d 363, 679 P.2d 746 (1984).
192. See Alpha Beta Inc. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. L. App.3d 1049, 1057, 207 Cal. L.
Rptr. 117, 121-22 (1984), vacated, 472 U.S. 1604 (1985); Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis.2d
559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), rev'd., 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
193. Redmond v. Dresser, 734 F.2d 633 (lth Cir. 1984).
194. Collins v. MBPXL Corp., 9 Kan. App.2d 363, 679 P.2d 746, 749-52 (1984).
195. See Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1965); Thompson v.
Modernfold Industries, 175 Ind. App. 686, 373 N.E.2d 916 (1978).
196. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
197. See, e.g., Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
198. Hayworth v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App.2d 723, 181 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1982);
Weiss v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Mich. App. 519, 236 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1975).
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determinative factor of whether they are pre-empted. If the arbitration
remedy is available but not used, failure to exhaust precludes the claims; if
arbitration is available and used, it is refutable only on the narrow grounds
set forth in Vaca and the Steel Workers trilogy. Nevertheless, numerous deci-
sions prior to Allis-Chalmers placed great weight upon whether arbitration
was ignored entirely or whether it was completed prior to the filing of the
state claim.
Based on Maddox, one would have expected the courts to find pre-
emption most frequently when the claim had not been arbitrated because
the employee or his representative had failed to make use of the available
grievance and arbitration procedure. Maddox, after all, had precluded the
state claim because the grievance procedure had not been exhausted. How-
ever, just the opposite was true. For example, in Cushing v. General Time
Corp., 99 the court held that a plaintiff that had submitted to arbitration
her challenge to her suspension could not subsequently bring an outrage
action challenging the supervisor's behavior in connection with that suspen-
sion.2 w However, in the companion case of Collins v. General Time Corp.,20
the same judge held that the outrage claim of a plaintiff who had not yet
exhausted her contractual grievance and arbitration procedure was not pre-
empted.
In Wyatt v. Jewel Companies,202 the court held not pre-empted a claim
for discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim even
though the plaintiff had not exhausted the grievance and arbitration. How-
ever, Bertling v. Roadway Express, Inc.,2 3 while acknowledging Wyatt and
declining to reach the pre-emption question, held that the prior arbitration
and the plaintiff's discharge precluded the plaintiff, under state issue pre-
clusion law, from subsequently bringing a claim for discharge and retaliation
for filing a workmen's compensation suit.
2 4
4. According to Party
As is reflected by the Supreme Court's opinion in Maddox, the strength
of the federal policy favoring arbitration depends upon whether the finality
of arbitration can be undermined by parallel state law claims.2"' The problem
is the same whether the defendant named in the state law action is the
employer itself, or one of the employer's representatives individually, such
199. 549 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
200. Id. at 769-70.
201. 549 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
202. 108 Ill. App.3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982).
203. 121 I11. App.3d 60, 459 N.E.2d 265 (1984).
204. 459 N.E.2d at 267-68; compare Thompson v. Monsanto, 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.
1977) (holding claim for discharge in retaliation for filing workmen's compensation claim pre-
empted); with Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980) (court held claim for
discharge in retaliation for filing workmen's compensation claim not pre-empted because, inter
alia, there had been no final and binding arbitration).
205. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
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as a supervisor or an insurance carrier. If an employee can sue his or her
supervisor for actions taken in the course of employment, such as wrongful
discharge or fraud, the employer's incentive to honor an agreement to let
an arbitrator decide whether the discharge was for "just cause" is just as
frustrated as if the actions were directed against the employer itself. Recent
experience with allowing employees to circumvent workers' compensation
schemes by filing co-employee law suits demonstrates vividly how legislative
policy designating a particular remedy can be frustrated if other remedies
are allowed. Alabama's experience is typical. Alabama, one of a handful
of states allowing such actions, suffered measurably because it permitted
co-employee actions notwithstanding a worker's compensation scheme that
purported to provide employees with an exclusive remedy. As a result,
Alabama has sharply curtailed these claims.
201
Pre-Allis-Chalmers decisions appeared to recognize this danger in the
context of arbitral pre-emption. Payne v. Pennzoil Corp.2 7 affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of three supervisory employees against claims by
discharged subordinates that they interfered with plaintiffs' employment
contracts, invaded plaintiffs' privacy by engaging in surveillance following
his workers' compensation claim, and discharged him in retaliation for filing
workers' compensation claims.23 The court accepted the defendants' uncon-
troverted affidavits that they were acting within the scope of employment
and that, therefore, they were a "party" to the collective bargaining
agreement containing an arbitration clause. 209 Collins v. MBPXL Corp.,
210
in rejecting as pre-empted plaintiff's fraud and outrage against his employer
arising out of his discharge, also rejected without discussion the same claims
against his supervisor.
21'
The insurance company defendants did not fare as well. The Eighth
Circuit, in United Steel Workers of America v. General Steel Industries,
Inc. 21 2 held that a claim against the insurance carrier providing benefits pur-
suant to the employer's and the union's collective bargaining agreement was
not subject to arbitration because the insurer was not a party to the agree-
ment, 213 even though the employer and the union were required to arbitrate
their dispute concerning benefits paid pursuant to the separate insurance con-
tract (having no arbitration clause) because it was incorporated by reference
into the collective bargaining agreement (containing such a clause).
206. Ala. Code §§ 25-5-11, 25-5-53 (Michie Supp. 1986) (as amended); see generally
Johnson and Cassady, Co-Employee Lawsuits Under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 14 CumB. L. REv. 267 (1984).
207. 138 Ariz. 52, 672 P.2d 1322 (1983).
208. The court rejected state court decisions declaring that an arbitration agreement did
not oust the court of jurisdiction absolutely and limiting the scope of arbitration to issues set
forth in the clause's clear language. See 672 P.2d at 1325-26.
209. Id. at 1326-27.
210. 9 Kan. App.2d 363, 679 P.2d 746 (1984).
211. Id. at 751-52.
212. 499 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1974).
213. Id. at 217-18.
[Vol. 44:345
MUDDY WATERS
From the foregoing, it appears that, prior to Allis-Chalmers, a suit
against the insurance company for bad faith refusal to pay would not be
pre-empted even if payment were withheld by the employer's order, but
that a supervisory employee involved in carrying out the employee's order
would be immunized from suit by arbitral pre-emption. It is difficult to
draw such generalizations, however, because the number of cases are small,
they were decided by different courts, and those reaching the issue of parties
other than the employer were decisions that took a broad view of arbitral
pre-emption generally.
It is safe to say, however, that before Allis-Chalmers, the scope of
arbitral pre-emption in the lower courts was confused. State and lower
federal courts frequently based decisions finding no pre-emption on Garmon
or Alexander in situations to which Garmon and Alexander did not apply.
These tribunals frequently preserved torts because they were torts or because
the state felt they served a significant purpose. Matters such as timing and
the identity of the defendant made a difference when they should not have.
Guidance from the Supreme Court was sorely needed.
II. ALLIS-CHALmERS AND COMPANIONS
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck214 and in various companion cases1S
the Court once again addressed the issued posed by the incomplete doctrine
of arbitral pre-emption. These issues included first, the extent to which
Garmon and its progeny defined exceptions to arbitral pre-emption; second,
the scope of state law claims pre-empted; third, whether the state claim
came before or after arbitration made any difference in the scope of arbitral
pre-emption; and finally, the extent to which the scope of arbitral pre-
emption was affected by the identity of the defendant.
A. Allis-Chalmers
Allis-Chalmers held that an employee's failure to exhaust the grievance
and arbitration procedure pre-empted his state law claim of bad faith against
his employer for interfering with his disability benefits because resolution
of the bad faith tort claim was substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.
In Allis-Chalmers, an employee and a union negotiated, along with the
collective bargaining agreement, a separate disability plan, and provided
that the collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration proce-
dure would ultimately resolve any disability disputes.2 1 6 An employee claim-
ing that the employer interfered with disability benefits brought a bad faith
state tort action without exhausting the grievance and arbitration procedure.
The state trial and an intermediate appellant courts rejected the suit as pre-
214. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
215. See infra notes 242-62 and accompanying text.
216. 471 U.S. at 219-20.
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empted, but the state supreme court reversed because Garmon, as interpreted
by Farmer, made clear that bad faith actions touched only a peripheral
concern of the NLRA and, therefore, were saved from pre-emption.
21 7
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Lucas Flour extended
section 301 pre-emption to torts whose disposition was substantially de-
pendent on a collective bargaining agreement. The Court began by observing
that although Congress had not completely pre-empted the field from state
regulation through section 301, "courts [have] sustain[ed] a local regula-
tion 'unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme,
or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that
Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States."'
21 8
Declaring that Lucas Flour requires states to apply federal law to contract
suits brought for breaching a collective bargaining agreement, the Court in
Allis-Chalmers made clear that concerns about state interference articulated
in Lucas Flour extended beyond mere contract actions:
If the policies that animate section 301 are to be given their
proper range ... the pre-emptive effect of section 301 must extend
beyond suits alleging contract violations .... Thus, questions relat-
ing to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal
consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agree-
ment, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether
such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract
or in a suit alleging liability in tort.219
In making these remarks about arbitral pre-emption, the Court cautioned
that not every dispute concerning employment was covered, as "[s]uch a
rule of law would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power
to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfa-
vored." 20 Thus, "it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under
that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish
rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." '22' The issue was
whether the disposition of the state claim required analysis of contractual
terms: "If the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the con-
tractual relationship, the law is pre-empted." 222
The parameters of this pre-emption remained vague, however, because
state courts must accord the same deference to implicit as well as to express
contractual obligations and must not assume that there are no implicit
obligations created by a collective bargaining agreement; even the existence
of such obligations was a question of federal law.2 3 The Court indicated
217. See supra notes 181 & 192 and accompanying text.
218. 471 U.S. at 209 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
219. 471 U.S. at 210-11.






that, under the facts of Allis-Chalmers, the Garmon/Farmer distinction
between the objective of the conduct and the manner of the conduct did
not apply to arbitral pre-emption. In the case before it, the "parties'
agreement as to the manner in which a benefit claim would be handled,"
potentially covered in an implicit collective bargaining agreement term, "will
necessarily be relevant to any allegation that the claim was handled in a
dilatory manner." 224 Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust the grievance
and arbitration procedure, the bad faith claim was dismissed. 225
Although declaring that pre-emption would be determined on a case-
by-ease basis, the Court offered general guidance for ascertaining whether
arbitral pre-emption applied to a particular case: "We do not hold that
when the resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract, the claim must either be treated as a section 301 claim . . . or
dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. '226
The Court in Allis-Chalmers does not offer much guidance regarding
the nature of arbitral pre-emption, but it does address the doctrine's scope.
The Court squarely held that bad faith claims are pre-empted because they
require the adjudicating court to interpret and analyze contractual obliga-
tions, a function that federal law gives to the arbitrator in the first instance.
The Court's rationale appears likewise to require pre-emption of other
contract-based torts, such as interference with contractual relations or fraud.
Evaluating the opinion according to basis, state claims, impact before and
after arbitration, and impact according to the identity of the defendant,
reveals that the opinion offers little further guidance.
1. Nature
Allis-Chalmers did not address the issues surrounding the nature of
arbitral pre-emption. There was no question about the pleadings, and the
case did not involve a removal issue. However, Allis-Chalmers impacted
this issue indirectly through its delineation of pre-empted state claims from
preserved state claims. The Court's repeated emphasis on the need to
preserve from state intrusion the uniform federal law governing the con-
struction of collective bargaining agreements227 is consistent with past deci-
sions recognizing that section 301 displaces state court subject matter
jurisdiction to hear state claims requiring a construction of the collective
agreement. 22 Other than these implications, the decision is silent on the
nature of pre-emption.
224. Id. at 218.
225. Id. at 221.
226. Id.
227. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-212.
228. Id. at 212; see supra notes 156-57.
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2. Scope
Although Allis-Chalmers did not directly deal with the nature of arbitral
pre-emption, it certainly affected the scope.
a. according to basis
Allis-Chalmers made clear that arbitral pre-emption extended beyond
disputes involving express collective bargaining agreement language and
included also disputes involving implied contractual provisions. The Court
guaranteed that implied provisions would not be overlooked by holding that
the existence of implied contractual provisions was itself an issue of federal
law. The Court did not, however, consider the application of arbitral pre-
emption to disputes over "past practice" or "the law of the shop" in cases
in which the arbitration clause covered such disputes, but the collective
bargaining agreement did not expressly address them. When there existed
some express contractual language from which an implied provision could
be formed, Allis-Chalmers directed that arbitral pre-emption applied. Allis-
Chalmers did not appear to reach cases involving only past practice without
relation to such express language. 9
Allis-Chalmers continued the confusion over the exceptions to arbitral
pre-emption. Allis-Chalmers rests essentially upon a Morton/Machinist!
Malone basis, but the opinion pays homage to the Alexander analysis. The
Court preserves from pre-emption "rights and obligations independent of a
labor contract," ' 0 and suggests that drawing analogies between state statutes
and the federal statutory actions preserved in Alexander and its progeny is
an acceptable analysis.23' This is particularly curious because the analysis
begins with a different standard than the one applied by courts in reconciling
two conflicting federal statutes.2 3 2 If the same standards applied by federal
courts in reconciling conflicts between federal statutes were intended to be
applied in determining whether a state statutory action fell within the scope
of arbitral pre-emption, one would have expected that the analysis used in
reconciling the federal statutes would apply in this case as well. Allis-
Chalmers, however, did not do this. Rather than preserve the bad faith
claim under Alexander, Allis-Chalmers held the claim pre-empted.
On the positive side, it appears that the Court's discussion clearly rejects
the views of many lower courts that Garmon analysis somehow governs the
scope of arbitral pre-emption. The Court focuses most of its discussion on
Lucas Flour, a good sign because it demonstrates to state courts following
a Garmon analysis that labor arbitration does indeed have a federal statutory
basis and is not a matter of peripheral concern, and because it makes clear
229. See id.at 213 n.8.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 212, n.6, 213-14 n.9.
232. Id. at 211-12.
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that the federal statutory basis is section 301 and not, as these courts
believed, the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA.3
3
In addition, the Court in Allis-Chalmers grapples with the difference
between exceptions to Garmon pre-emption and exceptions to arbitral pre-
emption. While the Court reaches no firm conclusions, it recognizes expressly
that exceptions developed in the context of a pre-emption doctrine protecting
express statutory provisions cannot be applied as is in the context of a pre-
emption doctrine that protects a federally sanctioned relationship whose
precise parameters are left for the parties and the courts. The Court made
clear that "Congress, in adopting section 301, wished to give the substantive
provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any
inconsistent state regulation. ' 23 4 This was fundamentally different from
Garmon. The Court in Allis-Chalmers noted that "in this situation the
balancing by Garmon pre-emption is irrelevant, since Congress, acting within
its power under the Commerce Clause, has provided that federal law must
prevail."2 5s The independence of the state claim from the collective agree-
ment's terms, and not the strength of the state's interest in preserving the
claim, determined the scope of exceptions to arbitral pre-emption.
On the negative side, the Court, having determined that Garmon ex-
ceptions did not apply, failed to define artfully what exceptions did apply.
Instead, Allis-Chalmers provided plenty of ammunition for state courts that
insist on using Alexander to protect certain wrongful discharge claims from
arbitral pre-emption:
Clearly, section 301 does not grant the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under
state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits
for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional
intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe
conduct, or establish rights and obligations independent of a labor
contract.... While the nature of the state law is a matter of state
law, the question whether the ... [state] tort is sufficiently inde-
pendent of federal contract interpretation to avoid pre-emption is,
of course, a question of federal law.2 6
What this means is unclear. The blanket statement that the parties
cannot contract for what is illegal under state law is false and misleading.
It specifically contradicts Lucas Flour and Lincoln Mills. Surely the Court
does not mean that arbitration clauses are unenforceable in states that pro-
hibit arbitration. Nor would it seem, in light of the holding, that the Court
in Allis-Chalmers intended to limit arbitral pre-emption only to claims that
could, under state law, be waived in advance by contract. However, a state
court could read the language this way.
233. Id. at 213-14.
234. Id. at 211-12.
235. Id. at 213-14 n.9.
236. Id. at 212-14.
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Had the Court avoided the language quoted above, it could have
provided the clearest expression to date of the exceptions to arbitral pre-
emption. The Court could have been more helpful had it simply excepted
from pre-emption state claims arising from facts not implicating the collective
bargaining agreement. By adding the cryptic language referring to agree-
ments illegal under state law, however, the Court guaranteed continued
confusion.
b. according to claim
Allis-Chalmers is most confusing here. While assuring states, under
Alexander, that it does not disturb causes of action "independent" of the
collective bargaining agreement, 237 the Court in Allis-Chalmers lists many
such actions among claims it implicitly presumes to be pre-empted. 28 One
example is retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim.
Since retaliatory discharge is a statutory action in most states that recognize
it, a state court could reach conflicting conclusions depending on the part
of the Allis-Chalmers opinion on which it relied. On the one hand, it could
conclude that this is an independent statutory action and therefore not pre-
empted.29 Alternately, it could conclude that the unfair discharge, a com-
monly arbitrated grievance, is a matter solely for the arbitrator and that
the mere existence of state law does not convert a wrongful discharge claim
into an independent cause of action.-4 States that recognize the "public
policy" exception to the wrongful discharge theory face the same dilemma.
The state might contend that its basis for allowing the action is not the
agreement but some independent public policy, or, as before, the state
might conclude that, notwithstanding an independent public policy, the
discharge requires interpretation of the "just cause" provision of a collective
bargaining agreement.
c. according to time
Allis-Chalmers appears to dispose of the common lower court error of
applying different standards according to whether the state claim was filed
before or after a binding arbitration. Allis-Chalmers takes a completely
different approach to this issue than many state courts; whereas state courts
saw the absence of exhaustion as a mitigating factor (the employee had not
yet made the choice), Allis-Chalmers makes clear that this is not the case.
The Court could have done a better job, however, of explaining itself. The
Court's cryptic formula at the end of the opinion21 appears to mean that,
although different theories apply before and after arbitration, the result is
237. Id. at 212-13 n.8.
238. Id. at 218.
239. Id.
240. See supra note 188; see infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
241. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,, 471 U.S. at 220-21.
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the same. What the Court apparently means by distinguishing between a
claim being pre-empted by federal labor contract law and a claim being
"treated as a section 301 action" is that, under Maddox, a state claim
brought without exhausting arbitration is pre-empted242 and, under the
Steel Workers trilogy, a claim brought after arbitration is treated as a section
301 suit to set aside or to enforce the arbitrator's award.2 43 Practically speak-
ing, there is no difference between these two results because the failure to
exhaust arbitration is excused essentially for the same reasons that an arbitra-
tion award could be side aside-repudiation by the employer of the collective
bargaining agreement or breach by the union of the duty of fair representation.
B. Companion Cases
If the Court sent out conflicting signals in Allis-Chalmers, contempor-
aneous cases that were accorded summary disposition muddied the waters
even more. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores2 declined to review a decision
holding that a whistle-blower's public policy wrongful discharge claim was
not pre-empted because the state's significant interest in the public policy
under Garmon and Farmer warranted preserving it from pre-emption. The
Court also denied certiorari to two decisions finding not pre-empted claims
for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing workers' compensation
claims. 245 However, in Alpha Beta v. Superior Court,24 the Court vacated,
in light of Allis-Chalmers, a decision holding that a terminated employee's
outrage claim attacking her discharge was not pre-empted.
It is always dangerous to speculate based upon denials of certiorari
petitions and dispositions on summary review. However, the three denials
of certiorari here appear to cut against the very heart of Allis-Chalmers.
Wrongful discharges are contract law actions, matters frequently arbitrated
under collective bargaining agreements. One would expect a wrongful dis-
charge claim, traditionally an action in contract having to do only with the
fact of an employment decision, would be pre-empted before intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a tort action having to do with the manner
in which an employment decision was carried out. The Court did precisely
the opposite in Garibaldi and Alpha Beta.247 The only consistent explanation
of Allis-Chalmers, the two denials of certiorari, and Alpha Beta is that the
Court simply is not ready to face the interplay between recently created
242. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 656-59 (1965).
243. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 543,
598-99 (1960).
244. 471 U.S. 1099 (1985), denying cert. to 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984).
245. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), denying cert. to 105 Ill.2d 143,
473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984); Prestress Engingeering Co. v. Gonzales, 53 U.S.L.W. 3895 (June 24,
1985), denying cert. to 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1980).
246. 472 U.S. 1004 (1985), vacating 160 Cal. App.2d 1049, 207 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1984).
247. See supra notes 239-241 and accompanying text.
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state law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine and the long estab-
lished federal policy favoring arbitration.
The Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachu-
setts,24O rendered two months after Allis-Chalmers, offers further insight
into areas Allis-Chalmers left open. Although it did not involve arbitration,
Metropolitan Life is significant to arbitral pre-emption because it changes
the contours of the Morton/Machinists pre-emption on which arbitral pre-
emption is based. In Metropolitan Life, the Court held that he NLRA did
not pre-empt a state statute requiring employers to include mental illness
within the coverage of any medical insurance plan provided employees even
though, as in Oliver, the state law limited the parties' agreement regarding
a mandatory subject of bargaining. 24 9 Relying heavily upon the NLRA's
declaration of policy, the Court reasoned that the state statutes establishing
minimum standards did not interfere with the NLRA's purposes, and that
the same logic that justified preservation of actions under similar federal
statutes against preclusion by a prior arbitration decision warranted pres-
ervation of such state statutes.
250
Metropolitan Life muddies the water further because it suggests approval
for decisions that preserve state law claims from pre-emption by analogy
to the Alexander/Barrentine/McDonald line of cases. In upholding the
Massachusetts statute, the Court observes that, under Barrentine, collective
bargaining policies do not preclude federal actions under statutes that
establish minimum standards. 1 The Court then declares flatly that state
statutes establishing minimum standards do not interfere with NLRA poli-
cies.25 2 It does not require a conceptual leap to conclude that if state
minimum standards statutes are not inconsistent with NLRA policies, sta-
tutory claims for wrongful discharge under such statutes are not pre-empted
under Taft-Hartley's policy favoring arbitration.
The next major section 301 pre-emption case, like Metropolitan Life,
sheds light on arbitral pre-emption under Allis Chalmers even though arbitral
pre-emption was not involved. IBEW v. Hechler253 held that a bargaining
unit employee's personal injury negligence action against her union for
breach of its duty to train her and provide her a safe workplace was pre-
empted under Allis Chalmers because "[i]n order to determine the Union's
tort liability, . . . a court would have to ascertain, first, whether the
collective bargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care on
the Union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe workplace, and,
second, the nature and scope of that duty, that is, whether, and to what
extent, the Union's duty extended to the particular responsibilities alleged
248. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
249. Id. at 758.
250. Id. at 756-58.
251. Id. at 755.
252. Id..
253. 55 U.S.L.W. 4694 (May 26, 1987).
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by respondent in her complaint." 2 -4 Because here, as in Allis Chalmers,
" 'questions of contract interpretation ... underlie any finding of tort
liability,' "265 the "need for federal uniformity in the interpretation of
contract terms ... mandates that here, respondent is precluded from evading
the pre-emptive force of section 301 by casting her claim as a state-law tort
action.'
256
The Court's decision in Hechler is important both for the question it
resolves and for the question it declined to reach. It stressed that state law
normally placed the duty of providing a safe workplace only on the
employer,257 and declined to reach the issue of whether a different result
would follow if state law placed this duty on the Union as well.2 8 Because
state law recognized no such duty there, it could arise only from the collective
bargaining agreement. Therefore, here, as in Allis Chalmers, judicial reso-
lution of the tort would require judicial construction of the agreement.
While the Court's decision was consistent with an interpretation of Allis
Chalmers that recognized broad pre-emption, this rationale suggested that
the Court viewed Allis Chalmers much more narrowly. What would the
Court do if an employee challenged the investigation of his discharge under
the independent state law basis of invasion of privacy and bypassed a
collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure?2 9 The holding in
Allis Chalmers, coupled with the Steel Workers trilogy, dictated that this claim
be treated as pre-empted, but the "independent of federal contract interpreta-
tion" language in Allis Chalmers, coupled with the rationale of Hechler, sug-
gests a different result.
So might the Court's most recent section 301 pre-emption decision.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams260 held that when employees bring suit on an
implied contract made while they were outside the bargaining unit but
breached by their layoff after they were demoted into the bargaining unit,
the claim could not be removed as "artfully pleaded" under section 301
even though the employer claimed that the collective bargaining agreement
operated to extinguish all express or implied contracts made prior to entering
the bargaining unit. The Court, while declining to opine on the merit of
section 301 pre-emption as an affirmative defense, 26' held that section 301
pre-emption did not render the claim itself a section 301 claim because the
claim was based upon a contract independent of the collective bargaining
254. Id. at 4697.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 4696.
258. Id. at 4697-98 n.5.
259. See, e.g., Kirby v. Allegheny Bev. Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1987) (a
pre-Hechler case that held privacy claim pre-empted); Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d
703, 705 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
260. 55 U.S.L.W. 4804 (June 9, 1987).
261. Id. at 4807 n.13.
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agreement.262 It had the independent basis that the negligence claim in
Hechler lacked.
While this rational has a superficial appeal, a closer examination reveals
potential for confusion in the state and lower federal courts, There is a
difference between the bad faith claim in Allis Chalmers, which required a
construction of the collective bargaining agreement's express and implied
insurance benefit terms as part of the determination of the elements of bad
faith, and the claim in Williams, which did not implicate the collective
agreement in the determination of the elements of breach of the independent
contract, but only implicated the collective agreement in the adjudication
of the validity of the employee's affirmative defense. Only in adjudications of
whether the collective agreement waived prior agreements would implicate
the collective agreement, only then would pre-emption be relevant. Lower
courts may easily misread this decision as standing for the proposition that
a state law claim by a bargaining unit employee for breach of an independent
contract with terms addressing the same subjects as the collective bargaining
agreement will survive a claim of section 301 pre-emption. This cannot have
been intended, as it would be contrary to J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 263 and
would undermine the Steel Workers trilogy. Properly viewed, Williams is con-
sistent with Allis Chalmers, but the potential for confusion exists because some
lower courts could conclude that claims that do involve the collective agree-
ment at the breach stage-such as the claim for breach of an independent
agreement on a subject covered by the collective agreement-are not pre-
empted. This is not what Williams held, and it would be contrary to J. L Case.
C. Summary
Allis-Chalmers, its companions, and subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions, answered some of the questions about arbitral pre-emption that
previously had confused state and lower federal courts. First, Allis-Chalmers
made clear that the Garmon analysis was not the correct analysis in which
to evaluate an arbitral pre-emption claim. Second, Allis-Chalmers made
clear that the issue of whether a particular state law claim was pre-empted
would depend upon whether, under federal law, it was sufficiently inde-
pendent of the collective bargaining agreement and the collective bargaining
agreement's express or implied obligations, or, on the other hand, whether
under federal law, its disposition required a substantial construction of
express or implied terms. Third, Allis-Chalmers suggests, and Metropolitan
Life, Hechler, and the summary disposition of Allis-Chalmers companion
cases affirm Alexander and its progeny will have some relevance in deter-
mining whether a state claim is sufficiently independent to be saved from
pre-emption. Finally, the Allis-Chalmers companion cases make clear that
262. Id. at 4806-07.
263. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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the Court has not yet come to grips with the interplay between the federal
policy favoring arbitration-a policy created at a time when "employment-
at-will" was the standard under state law-and the more recently created
state law exceptions to the "employment-at-will" doctrine. This seems to
mean that future development of the doctrine of arbitral pre-emption will
depend upon the extent to which the Court concludes that the new state
law exceptions provided more reliable protection to discharged employees
than does union representation at an arbitration.
IV. ARBITRAL PRE-EmpTIoN AFTER ALLIS-Cm mmRS
About two years have passed since the Supreme Court decided Allis-
Chalmers, and it is too early to gauge the full impact of the decision.
However, in decisions since Allis-Chalmers, there has developed a noticeable
increase in the amount of respect accorded the arbitral pre-emption doctrine
as a separate and distinct doctrine from pre-emption under Garmon.
264
Moreover, recent decisions accord broader parameters to arbitral pre-emp-
tion, holding pre-empted state claims that would have been preserved
before.26' Third, despite the fact that Allis-Chalmers provided only per-
functory treatment to the issue, most decisions since Allis-Chalmers evidence
no distinction in treatment according to whether the state law claim is filed
before or after the arbitration. 66 Finally, the arbitral pre-emption doctrine
has expanded in scope according to party, with decisions now recognizing
that the employer's insurer, as well as supervisory employees, can enjoy the
protection of a grievance and arbitration clause. Nevertheless; much remains
to be done.
A. Nature of Arbitral Pre-emption
After Allis-Chalmers, confusion continues to reign in the dispute con-
cerning the nature of arbitral pre-emption. The Supreme Court's reasoning
in the recent International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis 67 decision would
appear to put to rest any lingering doubts that federal labor pre-emption
affects subject matter jurisdiction. The Court noted:
A claim of Garmon pre-emption is a claim that the state court
has no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and
when a claim of Garmon pre-emption is raised, it must be considered
and resolved by the state court. Consequently, the state procedural
rule [treating it as an affirmative defense] ... was not a sufficient
ground, and the union is entitled to an adjudication of its pre-
emption claim on the merits.26'
264. See infra notes 273-75 and accompanying test.
265. See infra notes 320-35, 343-52, and accompanying text.
266. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
267. 476 U.S. 380, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986).
268. Davis, 476 U.S. at 390, 106 S. Ct. at 1913.
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Franchise Tax Board seemed to say the same thing about section 301
pre-emption, of which arbitral pre-emption is a subset. "[T]he pre-emptive
force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause
of action 'for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, not
withstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the
absence of section 301 .1269 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cater-
pillar Tractor Corp. v. Williams270 does not support a contrary conclusion.
There the Court held that a suit on an implied contract made while plaintiffs
were outside the bargaining unit but breached by their layoff after plaintiffs
were demoted back into the bargaining unit could not be removed to federal
court as an artfully pleaded section 301 claim.
The Court in Williams expressly reaffirmed its declaration in Franchise
Tax that when section 301 pre-emption was implicated, it affected subject
matter jurisdiction and was not purely an affirmative defense. The Court
held simply that adjudication of the elements of a claim for breach of a
contract independent of the collective bargaining agreement did not involve
a construction of the collective agreement and, therefore, did not involve
section 301 pre-emption. That adjudication of the affirmative defense of
waiver might involve the collective agreement and, therefore, section 301
pre-emption, did not affect removal, which depended upon the plaintiff's
claim.
The Court thus makes clear in Williams that section 301 pre-emption,
of which arbitral pre-emption is a part, is treated as an affirmative defense
for removal purposes only when the adjudication of an affirmative defense,
such as the waiver defense involved there, and not the adjudication of the
plaintiff's claim, required a substantial construction of the collective bar-
gaining agreement under Allis Chalmers. This did not mean that a defendant
would be required to plead pre-emption affirmatively or waive it. If pre-
emption arises because the plaintiff's claim requires a substantial construc-
tion of the collective agreement, Franchise Tax Board dictates that the
court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim depends upon
federal law under section 301. The defendant need only plead the defense
giving rise to pre-emption. If, as in Williams, the adjudication of some
defense implicates the collective bargaining agreement and raise pre-emption
only at that stage, the fact that section 301 law may govern the disposition
of the affirmative defense does not absolve the defendant from asserting
it.271
There is, however, support for a contrary view that arbitral pre-emption,
because of unique characteristics, is different in nature than Garmon pre-
emption. Three factors support this view. First, Maddox never refers to
269. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
270. 55 U.S.L.W. 4804 (June 9, 1987).
271. See generally Davis, 476 U.S. at 393, 106 S. Ct. at 1916-18 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring, joined by Powell, Stevens, O'Conner, JJ.).
[Vol. 44:345
MUDDY WATERS
subject matter jurisdiction; it speaks only in terms of exhaustion when
discussing arbitral pre-emption. Exhaustion of remedies is an affirmative
waivable defense; it does not affect subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the
high position Allis-Chalmers accords to independent state causes of action
is uncharacteristic of something powerful enough to displace subject matter
jurisdiction. If, under Allis-Chalmers, the employer and the union cannot
agree to anything illegal under state law, how can the agreement of the
parties displace the state court's jurisdiction to determine under traditional
tort theories whether illegality has occurred? The third factor involves the
nature of federal subject matter jurisdiction. If the parties to a dispute
cannot, by agreement, confer or remove a court's subject matter jurisdiction,
how can they agree to divest the state court of jurisdiction by agreeing to
designate their own private decision maker?
These factors are not persuasive. Although Maddox never refers to
arbitral pre-emption as affecting subject matter jurisdiction, one cannot
infer that the Court in Maddox did not have this in mind. Maddox meant
that section 301 pre-empts the claim, but that arbitration must be exhausted
before a section 301 action may be brought. Maddox, like Lucas Flour,
established that the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause
displaced state law claims involving matters covered by the clause, and that
the summary procedure outlined in the Steel Workers trilogy to follow
arbitration made clear that the state law did not simply become avail-
able again after arbitration was "exhausted." Rather, section 301's
scheme replaced the state law claims entirely. Regarding the second
factor, the position accorded independent state law claims simply reflects
that with arbitral pre-emption, as with Garmon pre-emption, ours is a
federal system that requires some means of accommodating state and federal
interests. This does not change the fact that federal law, when applicable,
displaces state law entirely. The third factor, the limitation of jurisdiction
by agreement, misunderstands the nature of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and its arbitration clause. According to United Steel Workers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the collective bargaining
agreement is not just a contract; it is the code that establishes an industrial
system of self-government. The grievance and arbitration procedure is not
simply an alternative to litigation; it is an alternative to industrial strife,
and is at the heart of the collective bargaining agreement's system of
industrial self-government. 272 Thus, it is not the collective agreement that
displaces court subject matter jurisdiction over state claims; it is the congres-
sional designation through LMRA sections 301 and 203(d) of the parties'
arbitrator as the forum of choice for the resolution of disputes with the
employer. From the foregoing, it is evident that the better view is to treat
arbitral pre-emption as affecting subject matter jurisdiction for pleading
purposes.
272. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1959).
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By making clear that Garmon pre-emption affects subject matter juris-
diction, the Court in Davis has suggested implicitly that this is true as well
of arbitral pre-emption. As discussed previously, dicta in the earlier Fran-
chise Tax Board decision, followed more recently in Caterpillar, supports
this extension. Doubtless, some courts will become confused and reject this
analogy on grounds that the parties cannot, by agreement, divest a court
of jurisdiction. Doubtless, the Court will have to face this issue soon.
However, Davis, together with the earlier Franchise Tax Board dicta,
represents a first step in defining the nature of arbitral pre-emption.
While Davis, and not Allis-Chalmers, is principally responsible for
making clear pre-emption is jurisdictional rather than an affirmative defense,
the changes made by Allis-Chalmers will make it easier for the lower courts
to apply the Davis subject matter jurisdiction rule developed in a Garmon
case in the context of arbitral pre-emption as well. Allis-Chalmers, by
expanding the scope of arbitral pre-emption to include many traditional
torts, reaffirms the Franchise Tax Board view as the correct description of
arbitral pre-emption.
B. Scope of Arbitral Pre-emption
Allis-Chalmers has cleared up many of the problems with state and
lower federal court analysis of arbitral pre-emption by declaring that Garmon
does not apply. Some courts persist in applying Garmon, but now even some
courts finding no pre-emption recognize that Garmon analysis has been
rejected by the Court in Allis-Chalmers. However, Allis-Chalmers has been
less successful in clearing up the misapplication of Alexander to state law, and
other courts have had trouble understanding the factors determining when
a state claim is sufficiently independent of the contract in order to survive
the pre-emption.
1. According to Basis
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Gibson v. AT&T Technologies,
27
exemplifies the impact of Allis-Chalmers on invitations to apply Garmon
to arbitral pre-emption. There, the court rejected employees' contentions
that fraud claims arising out of a plant closing were preserved from pre-
emption under Garmon's "deeply rooted in local feeling" exception. Relying
on Allis-Chalmers, the court declared that "the standards set out in Garmon
which engage in a'balancing' of state and federal interests, are irrelevant to
the different question presented here." 274
Although the Court in Allis-Chalmers has cleared up most of the
confusion about Garmon, some courts still persist in applying Garmon and
273. 782 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1986).
274. Id. at 689.
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Garmon-progeny cases in the arbitral pre-emption context.275 Most egregious
among these is the frequently-reversed 276 Alabama Supreme Court's recent
decision in Surrency v. Harbison.2 7 Disregarding Allis-Chalmers, the court
there astonishingly declared that "[ilintentional torts claims, such as defa-
mation and assault and battery actions . . are not pre-empted from
consideration in state court" because the court found that Maddox "did
not intend such language to apply to all types of lawsuits, because the
following year the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act did
not bar maintenance of a libel action" in Linn.278 This flagrant misappli-
cation of Garmon analysis flies in the face of Allis-Chalmers, which itself
involved the type of intentional tort that Surrency would preserve from pre-
emption.
The Garmon-progeny Linn exception simply is not appropriate in the
context of arbitral pre-emption. Arbitral pre-emption anticipates that all
claims arising out of arbitrable matters such as discharge will be subject to
the exclusive arbitration remedy. Whether called a defamation claim, an
outrage claim, or a wrongful discharge claim, any claim caused by a
discharge or the investigation leading up to a discharge should be subject
to arbitration alone if the collective bargaining agreement contains provisions
governing final and binding resolution of discharge disputes. Allis-Chalmers
makes clear that claims having to do with the manner of discharge in such
instances are governed by federal law determining the extent to which
express obligations concerning the fact of discharge give rise to implied
obligations concerning the manner of discharge.
If, as the Fifth Circuit in Strachan v. Union Oil Co.27 9 recognized, the
focus is on the employer's action, and not on the theory plaintiff uses to
attack it, this should be as true for Linn's defamation tort as it is for other
torts.2 0 The only question regarding the state tort is whether some element
of it requires a substantial construction of the express or implied terms of
275. In Mitchell v. Pepsi Cola, 772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985) for example, the court held
that the defamation claim of a plaintiff arising out of his discharge was not pre-empted
because Linn, a Garmon-progeny case, held that defamation was not pre-empted by the
NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions. The same was true in Strachan v. Union Oil Co.,
768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985), a case that followed Linn regarding a defamation claim even
though it otherwise strictly adhered to Allis-Chalmers with regard to other state law claims.
The court in Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986), held that the fraud
and quasi-contract claims of employees bumped from their jobs pursuant to a negotiated
preferential hiring agreement were not pre-empted because in part, these claims were "deeply
rooted in local standards of individual and social responsibility. Anderson, 803 F.2d at 957.
But cf. Anderson, 803 F.2d at 960 (Bright, J., dissenting).
276. The United States Supreme Court has twice rejected the rationale of the Alabama
court's decisions involving labor pre-emption. See supra notes 100, 129 & 267 and accompanying
text.
277. 489 So.2d 1097 (Ala. 1986). The Alabama court reached the opposite conclusion a year
later in a decision that never mentions Surrency. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays, - So.2d
-, (Aug. 21, 1987).
278. Id. at 1102.
279. 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
280. But see id. at 706.
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the collective bargaining agreement. If the litigation of a defamation claim
arising out of discharge requires construction of express and implied collec-
tive bargaining agreement obligations governing discharge, the defamation
claim is pre-empted without regard to what Linn says. If the defamation
claim attacks behavior independent of collective bargaining agreement ex-
press and implied obligations, however, it is not pre-empted.
The decision of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin in Muenchow v. Parker Pen Co.28 made clear that Allis-
Chalmers had some influence even among decisions that persisted in follow-
ing Garmon. In applying Garmon, the court in Muenchow gave heavier
weight to the policy favoring arbitration than did pre-Allis-Chalmers deci-
sions, which generally treated this policy as a "peripheral concern." 282
Even after Allis-Chalmers, some courts continue to focus on the suffi-
ciency of the state law remedy.2 3 By far, however, the most common post-
Allis-Chalmers analytical error has been the continued insistence of some
courts in applying Alexander analysis to state causes of action. 28 4 Allis-
Chalmers encouraged this error by mentioning the preservation of inde-
pendent state actions and stating in dicta that a collective bargaining
agreement could not be enforced on a subject illegal under state law.
Muenchow, misled by this dicta and by Allis-Chalmers' implied approval of
Alexander, held not pre-empted a claim for fraud against an employer because
of alleged misrepresentations to induce employees to terminate seniority
rights:
The Court's analysis in Allis-Chalmers suggests that the question
for purposes of § 185(a) [§ 301 of the LMRA] pre-emption is not
simply whether the dispute underlying plaintiffs' claims may be
subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but
whether plaintiffs' claims rely upon state rules that do not exist
independently of private agreements and that can be prospectively
waived or altered by such agreements, and thus cannot be resolved
without consideration of the collective bargaining agreement. In the
case before the court, pre-emption would not apply because plain-
tiffs' state claims of deceptive mispresentations rely upon state rules
that exist independently of private agreements and that cannot be
prospectively waived or altered by such agreements.
285
281. 615 F. Supp. 1405 (D.C. Wis. 1985).
282. See, e.g., supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1985) (found
pre-emption when the collective bargaining agreement gave the same remedy available under
state tort law); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass, 762 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1985) (followed by
similar line of reasoning in finding pre-empted a claim for discharge in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim). Although Allis-Chalmers seemed to direct its attention away
from the comparative sufficiency of the remedies offered by the arbitrator, it did contain some
discussion of this issue, and Maddox emphasized the propriety of arbitration on the particular
facts as a qualifying circumstance to its decision. See Maddox, 379 U.S. at 657.
284. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
285. 615 F. Supp. at 1415.
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This analysis flies in the face of Lucas Flour's admonition that section
301 actions are governed by federal law. Furthermore, the analysis disregards
Allis-Chalmers' declaration that "the question whether the Wisconsin tort
is sufficiently independent of federal contract interpretation to avoid pre-
emption is, of course, a question of federal law. ' 2 6 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, in Muenchow seemed
to say that whether a claim can be waived prospectively by being subject
to a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause is a matter of state
law; Lucas Flour and Allis-Chalmers, however, mandate that this is matter
of federal law. The Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia in Yoho
v. Triangle PWC, Inc.2.7 makes the same error in holding not pre-empted
an action for discharge in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation
claim.
Unlike decisions prior to Allis-Chalmers, however, numerous courts
have not been misled. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in Cavins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.21' recognized
that Allis-Chalmers required focusing upon the employer's act and not upon
the state law claim chosen to challenge it: "Among other matters, the Court
is convinced that the resolution of the present plaintiff's five state law
claims is, in Justice Blackmun's words,'substantially dependent upon anal-
ysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract."'289
The Eighth Circuit in Bell v. Gas Service Co. 290 looked past a fraud
claim and recognized that "appellant's claim turns on the application of
appellee's bid procedure, training procedure, and disqualification procedure,
all of which are subject to grievance under the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 291 The United States District Court for Montana in Hohn v. Kaiser
Cement Corp.292 looked past claims of wrongful discharge and outrage,
finding both pre-empted because both related only to plaintiff's discharge.
The Fifth Circuit in Strachan v. Union Oil Co. 293 likewise dismissed various
state tort claims arising out of drug and urine tests used in an employment
investigation that cleared two plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' obvious
remedy was to refuse the tests and then grieve their discharge. 29 4
286. 471 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1985).
287. 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
288. 609 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
289. 609 F. Supp. at 313 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216).
290. 778 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1985). Anderson v. Ford Motor Co. distinguished Bell when,
as here, the fraud claim did not, under state law, require a construction of the collective
bargaining agreement. Anderson, 803 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3242 (1987). Nevertheless, Anderson can be distinguished because it involved probationary employees
who, like the employees in Varnum raised hiring claims not covered by the collective bargaining
agreement. See id. at 959.
291. Bell, 778 F.2d at 517.
292. 624 F. Supp. 549 (D. Mont. 1986).
293. 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
294. Id. at 705.
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The United States District Courts for the Northern District of Illinois
in Clark v. Momence Packing Co.295 and the Eastern District of Missouri
in Johnson v. Hussmann Corp.296 held pre-empted actions for discharges in
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims because both courts
recognized that, without regard to the nature of the state claim, the
challenged act was the discharge and the adjudication of the state claims
would require substantial construction of collective bargaining agreement
provisions governing discharge.29 The court in Clark further observed,
contrary to Muenchow, that it did not matter that, under state law, one
could not waive in advance by contract one's right not to be discharged
for filing a workers' compensation claim.
298
One issue raised by Allis-Chalmers was whether state claims were only
pre-empted if they required a "substantial construction" of a collective
bargaining agreement clause other than the arbitration clause, or whether
the arbitration clause itself was enough. In Barnes v, Purex Corp.,299 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
holding a wrongful discharge claim pre-empted, focused neither on the
arbitration clause nor the "just cause" clause, but rather on the implications
of a seniority provision.3°° Likewise, Malone v. Kitchens of Sara Lee3°1 held
a discharge claim pre-empted because a precise contract clause covered the
reason for discharge. 302 Vantine and Clark relied on "just cause" for
discharge provisions. 03
While Allis-Chalmers clarified arbitral pre-emption in some respects, it
created uncertainty regarding the breadth of arbitral pre-emption. Did it cover
disputes only concerning express contractual terms? Did it include disputes
covered by terms arising by implication from express terms? Did it include
disputes over matters left open by the agreement's express terms but settled
by past practice or the common law of the shop? Prior to Allis-Chalmers,
Warrior & Gulf Navigation indicated that when the grievance and arbitration
clause was drafted sufficiently broadly, arbitral pre-emption would cover all
three types of disputes:
The collective bargaining agreement states the right and duties
of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate.... The collective agreement covers the whole employ-
ment relationship. It calls into being a new common law-the
295. 637 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
296. 610 F. Supp, 757 (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986).
297. Clark, 637 F. Supp. at 18; Johnson, 610 F. Supp. at 759.
298. Clark, 637 F. Supp. at 19.
299. No. 85-2283 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1985).
300. Id. Slip op. at 2.
301. 613 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
302. Id. at 1075-76.
303. See Vantine, 762 F.2d at 517; Clark, 657 F. Supp. at 18; see also Smith v. Capitol
Manufacturing Co., 626 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.3 4
Warrior & Gulf Navigation held that an arbitrator, in making a decision
about a particular grievance arising under the contract, could look beyond
the contract's express terms to "the industrial common law-the practices
of the industry and the shop-[because they were] ... equally a part of
the collective bargaining agreement although not expresses in it. ' '305 Did this
mean that the arbitral pre-emption extended to disputes arising over a matter
governed only by past practice and the common law of the shop? The
Court in Warrior & Gulf Navigation seemed to say yes, declaring any
disputes between the parties to be arbitrable unless the particular collective
bargaining agreement specifically excluded it.30
6
At least one circuit picked up from where Warrior & Gulf Navigation
left off, holding that if disputes over matters of past practice were subject
to the grievance and arbitration clause, the availability of arbitration pre-
vented aggrieved employees from bringing state tort actions based on these
disputes. In Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 0 7 the Fifth Circuit
held pre-empted a discharged employee's state tort actions arising out of
his former employer's alleged misrepresentation that all linemen were af-
forded lifetime employment3 '1 The court viewed this claim as a dispute of
a matter covered by the "industrial common law" and as pre-empted by
Warrior & Gulf Navigation.31 9
Under the pre-Allis-Chalmers view, therefore, employees having disputes
arising out of their employee's application of "past practice" or the "com-
mon law of the shop" would be precluded from bringing a state court suit
if the arbitration clause arguably covered such disputes. It was unnecessary
to show that some express contractual provision or its implications governed
the merits of the dispute. Allis-Chalmers confused lower courts into search-
ing for express provisions governing the merits of disputes because the
Court in Allis-Chalmers couched the scope of arbitral pre-emption in terms
of whether an express or implied collective bargaining agreement provision
applied. 10 The Court in Allis-Chalmers did not inquire whether "past
practice" or the "common law of the shop" governed the employer's
manner in paying health insurance claims; rather, it found pre-emption
because the express contractual language governing payment of insurance
benefits gave rise to implied contractual provisions governing the manner
of payment, and the manner of payment was at the heart of the merits of
the state cause of action.
31
304. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-79 (1960).
305. Id. at 581-82.
306. Id. at 584-85.
307. 730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
308. Id. at 364.
309. Id. at 363.
310. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216, 220.
311. Id. at 220.
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
This is more than a matter of semantics. If an arbitration clause did
not expressly except grievances arising in connection with a past practice
neither mentioned in nor capable of implication from a collective bargaining
agreement's express terms, lower courts that require an express or implied
clause governing the merits of a dispute could read Allis-Chalmers as
preserving the employee's right to bring a state-court suit. Such courts would
reason that, under Allis-Chalmers, the state-court tort or contract claims
were independent of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Such analysis, however, emasculates Warrior & Gulf Navigation's dec-
laration that "[t]he industrial common law-the practices of the industry
and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement
although not expressed in it. ' '312 This could not have been the Court's intent
in Allis-Chalmers. The Court nowhere indicated expressly that it was limiting
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, but rather relied in part on Warrior & Gulf
Navigation in reaching its conclusion.3 13 Nevertheless, the Court also treated
the agreement in question less like "a generalized code to govern a myriad
of cases" 314 and more like an ordinary contract, holding pre-empted only
"state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private
agreements. ' 315 Thus, the uncertainty remains.
In summary, Allis-Chalmers had three effects on the basis of later cases.
First, it has largely eliminated mistaken reliance on Garmon by making
clear that whether a state claim is saved from pre-emption depends upon
whether the claim is sufficiently independent of the collective agreement as
not to require a substantial construction of the agreement's terms, and does
not, as in Garmon, involve the strength of the state's interest in preserving
the claim. Second, it has largely perpetuated uncertainty about arbitral pre-
emption exceptions by perpetuating the basis on which to analogize state
claims to federal statutes protected from pre-emption by Alexander. Finally,
it has raised the issue of whether arbitral pre-emption applies at all to
claims over the application of "past practice" or "the common law of the
shop" that do not involve matters addressed by the express language and
implications of the collective bargaining agreement.
2. According to Claim
Obviously, Allis-Chalmers limits the types of available state claims that
can survive arbitral pre-emption. However, the curious references in Allis-
Chalmers to the impossibility of agreeing to a collective bargaining provision
illegal under state law, together with the Court's reliance upon Alexander
terminology, makes clear that Allis-Chalmers does not draw clear boundaries
between claims that are pre-empted and claims that are not.
312. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581-82.
313. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.
314. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578.
315. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.
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Wrongful discharge claims continue to create some controversy, al-
though most courts hold them pre-empted. As before, the two trouble areas
involved statutes making it unlawful to discharge in retaliation for filing
workers' compensation claims, and judicially-created theories allowing ac-
tions for wrongful discharge in violation of a public policy. Regarding
retaliatory discharges, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Yoho
v. Triangle PWC, Inc.,31 6 relied upon Allis-Chalmers' misleading language
to find a retaliatory discharge claim not pre-empted. 3 7 The Second Circuit
tripped over the same stumbling block in Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Div.,3"8 in which it preserved from pre-emption a state law claim
of discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim.
31 9
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
in Smith v. Hussmann Corp.,320 concluded that state law rights and obli-
gations that do not exist independently of collective bargaining agreements
are pre-empted by those agreements. 321 The court further reasoned that "an
action that permits an individual to sidestep the available grievance and
arbitration procedure eviscerates a central tenet of federal labor law.
''322
The court went on to relate how this conclusion in Allis-Chalmers changed
the court's mind about retaliatory discharges. 323
The issue raised by plaintiff in this case is whether or not he
was properly discharged. The parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment contains a grievance and arbitration procedure by which
plaintiff and other defendant's employees may challenge the pro-
priety of a decision by the defendant to terminate their employment.
It can fairly be said that the relationship between employer and
employee that is the subject of the collective bargaining agreement
is also the basis for the tort of retaliatory discharge under Missouri
law .... Therefore, because the Missouri law in this case is related
directly to and affects the contractual relationship between the
parties, it is pre-empted by the federal law. 3
24
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Clark v. Momence Packing Co.325 explains why analogizing state statutes
prohibiting retaliatory discharge did not, after Allis-Chalmers, survive pre-
316. 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
317. Id. at 207-08; see supra note 287 and accompanying text.
318. 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987).
319. See id. at 105-07. The court relied heavily upon Alexander, which does not apply to
state law claims, see supra note 180, and upon Allis-Chalmers' pronouncement that the parties
cannot agree to what state law makes illegal. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
320. 610 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986).
321. Smith, 610 F. Supp. at 758.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 758-59.
325. 637 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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emption under Alexander:
[The plaintiffs] misstate the right which avoids pre-emption; it is the
right to file a workmen's compensation claim without retaliation. This
right may exist independently of any contractual obligation between
unionized employees and their employers. However, the right to file
a workmen's compensation claim is not the equivalent of a right to
file a state tort claim for retaliatory discharge. A unionized employee
must first present his claim of retaliatory discharge as a grievance.
Federal law requires a unionized employee to exhaust contractually
created grievance procedures before filing suit in a court for discharge
and violation of a collective bargaining agreement .... The right to
file a workmen's compensation claim is not altered or compromised
by the federal preemption of the state tort action. A collective bargain-
ing agreement cannot allow an employer to violate the Illinois statute
prohibiting retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Such
a contract would be unenforceable.
32 6
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have accepted this logic.3 27 The position
of these decisions makes more sense. Arbitrators in the past have demon-
strated their ability to tackle the issue of discharge in retaliation for filing
a workers' compensation claim.32 There is no reason to believe they cannot
continue to do So.
329
It is too early to tell the precise influence of Garibaldi on Allis-Chalmers,
but it appears that at least some courts following Allis-Chalmers have relied
upon Garibaldi as supporting a distinction between public policy wrongful
discharge claims, which are not pre-empted, and other wrongful discharge
claims, which are pre-empted. Evangelista v. Inland-Boatman's Union of
the Pacific,30 a Ninth Circuit Garibaldi progeny case involving a dispute
over the impact of intermittent unemployment on seniority, held pre-empted
a wrongful discharge claim because, unlike the claim in Garibaldi, it did
not implicate a public policy. In Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp.33' the
Ninth Circuit held pre-empted a wrongful discharge claim under the covenant
of good faith theory because the contract provided as much protection as
did California wrongful discharge law and no public policy was implicated
326. Clark, 637 F. Supp. at 19; accord, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d
1031, 1044-47 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 87-259);
see Vantine v. Elkhardt Brass Manufacturing Co., 762 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1985).
327. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1044-47; Smith v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1986).
328. See, e.g., Papercraft Corp. v. United Paper Workers International Union Local
1446, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1963 (1985) (Edward E. Hales, Arb.); United Technologies Corp.
v. Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge No. 1746, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 92 (1982) (Richard Block,
Arb.); see also Mitchell v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers Co., 772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (considered
past arbitration decisions as part of the reason for holding that the plaintiff's wrongful
discharge claim was pre-empted).
329. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
330. 777 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985).
331. 764 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1985); accord Scott v. Machinists Automotive Trades Dist.,
815 F.2d 1281, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1987).
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as in Garibaldi. In Hohn v. Kaiser Cement Corp.3 3 2 the United States
District Court for the District of Montana held pre-empted a wrongful
discharge claim under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because
"Montana tort lav regarding good faith purports to define the meaning of
the contract relationship."13 3 In Smith v. Capitol Manufacturing Co.,334 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, though
noting in dicta that Garibaldi would allow a retaliatory discharge claim by
one discharged for seeking workers' compensation, held pre-empted a wrong-
ful discharge claim that did not implicate a public policy.
33
Despite Allis-Chalmers, defamation still continues to divide the courts.
The Seventh Circuit in Mitchell v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers, Inc., 316 held not pre-
empted a defamation claim arising out of a discharge, treating it separately
from the wrongful discharge claim found pre-empted, because a court
apparently concluded that Linn had preserved such claims from arbitral as
well as from Garmon pre-emption. 317 The Alabama Supreme Court has reached
opposite conclusions in decisions rendered within one year of each other.
33
Even Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 9 a decision that correctly looked through
other claims to the precipitating employment action to determine if the con-
tract dealt with it, did not do so for the defamation. Although stating the
proposition negatively-that defamation is pre-empted absent a showing of
malice-the court implicitly recognized that showing malice under Linn
preserves this claim against arbitral pre-emption.3 40 The Ninth Circuit in Tellez
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,"' although not falling prey to misapplication
of the Linn rationale, nevertheless held preserved from pre-emption a defama-
tion claim based on a suspension letter issued to a bargaining unit employee
because the relief provided by arbitration would be different. 343 This ignores
the precise holding of Allis-Chalmers, which held pre-empted a bad faith claim
even though a jury could have awarded more relief than an arbitrator. 313
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
did not commit either error in Cavins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 34 In
looking past a conspiracy to injure reputation claim, the court determined
that this and four other state pendent claims were substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a
332. 624 F. Supp. 54, (D. Mont. 1986).
333. Id. at 551.
334. 626 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
335. 626 F. Supp. at 112.
336. 772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1266 (1986); accord Barnes v.
Purex Corp., No. 85-2283 (E.D. Pa, Sept. 26, 1985).
337. Mitchell, 772 F.2d at 347.48.
338. Compare Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097, 1102 (Ala. 1986) (defamation not pre-
empted); with Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays, - So.2d - (Aug. 21, 1987) (defamation pre-
empted; no mention of Surrency).
339. 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
340. Id. at 706.
341. 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2481 (9th Cir. 1987).
342. Id. at 2483.
343. See Allis.Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 210-221.
344. 609 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
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labor contract because they all arose out of a dispute over insurance benefits
and a discharge.3 4 This is the correct view. The issue is not when, if ever,
defamation is pre-empted, but rather whether one should evaluate each state
claim separately or look beyond them to the particular employment action
they attack and then determine whether the elements of the state law claim
would require a construction of express or implied collective bargaining
provisions governing this employment action.
Nor was the Northern District of Alabama fooled in the unpublished
decision in Willie Gillis v. Reynolds Metals Co.3 4 6 There, an employee
suspended pending investigation of a fire brought a state law libel and
slander suit after being cleared by polygraph. The employee was covered
by a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance and arbitration
clause, but the employee brought his claim before exhausting the contractual
remedies. Holding the claim pre-empted, the court recognized that "in order
to enforce a national labor policy suits asserting state law tort claims arising
from the relationships created by the collective bargaining agreement, as
well as those alleging labor contract violations, must be pre-empted2 7
Inexplicably, fraud, not a subject of controversy before Allis-Chalmers,
now has divided courts as well. The Eighth Circuit in Bell v. Gas Service
Co. 34 8 held pre-empted plaintiff's fraud claim because it merely represented
one means of attacking employment practices subject to the collective
bargaining agreement. The court declared that the claim "turns on the
application of appellee's bid procedure, training procedure, and disqualifi-
cation procedure, all of which are subject to grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement. ' 3 9 The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion
in Gibson v. AT&T Technologies.310 On the other hand, the Court in
Muenchow v. Parker Pen Co., 3"' held that a fraud claim arising out of an
employer's alleged false inducements to terminate seniority rights created
and covered by the collective bargaining agreement was not pre-empted.
The Muenchow court read Allis-Chalmers as saying that all claims could
not be waived in advance under state law, because Allis-Chalmers declared
that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement could not agree to a
term illegal under state law, and because this state prohibited such pro-
spective waiver.352 This view is squarely contrary to Lincoln Mills and Lucas
Flour.
35 3
Fraud in hiring has developed into a peculiar subset of this controversy.
The Eleventh Circuit in Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers,3 4 and the Eighth
345. Id.
346. No. 86-7125 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff'd without op., 802 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1986).
347. Id.
348. 778 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1985).
349. Id. at 517.
350. 782 F.2d 686, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3275 (1986).
351. 615 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D. 1985).
352. Id. at 1411-1416.
353. See supra notes 79-81, 97-99, 285-86 and accompanying text; but cf. supra note 236 and
accompanying text.
354. 804 F.2d 638 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2181 (1987).
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Circuit, in Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., " have held that fraud in hiring
bargaining unit employees is not pre-empted. The Ninth Circuit, in Bale v.
General Telephone Co., 3"6 has reached a contrary conclusion.
Bale clearly is correct. To prove fraud in hiring them as temporary
employees upon an implied promise of vested rights after six months, the
plaintiffs would have had "to show that the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement differed significantly from the terms of the individual
contract they believed they had made."3 7
Anderson is not correct. Anderson, involving the bumping of new
employees during probation, found no pre-emption because the court mis-
takenly relied upon a Linn analysis and, contrary to Allis-Chalmers, con-
sidered significant the fact that fraud was "deeply rooted in local standards
of social and individual responsibility." ' 35 8 The court erred further in relying
on Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,3 9 a decision preserving the fraud claims of
persons with no recourse of any kind under the collective bargaining
agreement.36 Dissenting Judge Bright correctly observed that the majority's
reasoning disregarded the Supreme Court's J.L Case v. Borak36, decision's
declaration that the collective agreement supersedes the individual contract's
terms; and ignored the simple fact that a claim for fraudulently misrepre-
senting a collective bargaining agreement can never be independent of that
agreement. "[T]here is no way to measure the misrepresentations alleged
without examining that which has been misrepresented. ' 362 To allow such
suits would undermine the collective bargaining process as much as would
allowing suits on individual contracts with bargaining unit employees.
Varnum is a closer case because the plaintiffs were not yet members of
the bargaining unit. Varnum seems unwise nevertheless because, as Bale
shows, pre-hiring representations can affect employee privileges while subject
to the collective agreement. There the employer provided a prospective hiree
with incentive information it knew would be altered soon by changes in the
collective bargaining agreement that had been negotiated but not yet imple-
mented. While the employer's behavior is not to be condoned, Judge Bright's
words in Anderson ring true here as well. It is difficult to imagine how
better to undermine arbitration than allowing suits based upon the employ-
er's misrepresentation of the collective bargaining agreement's terms, and it
355. 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3242 (1987).
356. 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986).
357. Id. at 780.
358. 803 F.2d at 957. But see Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213 n.9.
359. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
360. See Anderson, 803 F.2d at 958-59. Belknap involved claims by temporary replacements
during an unfair labor practice strike that the employer falsely promised permanent positions
and then replaced them with returning strikers in settlement of a ULP charge. See Belknap,
463 U.S. at 500-512. Because temporary replacements must yield to returning unfair labor
practice strikers, these plaintiffs had no recourse under the collective agreement. The Anderson
plaintiffs faced no such dilemma.
361. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
362. Anderson, 803 F.2d at 960 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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is difficult to see how a court can evaluate such misrepresentations without
construing the agreement's terms. All such claims require a substantial
construction of applicable agreement terms because all such claims require
a determination of whether the employer's representation is true.
Nor can these decisions be defended as consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams. The Court in Williams held
simply that a claim for breach of contract independent of the collective bargain-
ing agreement may not per se be removed to federal court and automatically
treated as a section 301 claim. The Court expressly declined to consider whether
this claim, based upon an agreement made outside the collective bargaining
unit, is pre-empted because the unit employees, by agreeing to be bound
by the collective agreement, implicitly waived rights under any other con-
tract. 3
63
Other torts almost uniformly have been found pre-empted. Outrage, the
tort that Farmer made the center of controversy before Allis-Chalmers, almost
uniformly has been found pre-empted in post-Allis-Chalmers decisions. 31"
The same is true of invasion of privacy,'" Torts such as tortious interference
suits against the union3" ' or the employer 367 and a suit for insurance benefits
due and owing3" likewise have been held pre-empted.
3. According to Timing
Before Allis-Chalmers, there appeared to be a distinction between how
some courts treated arbitral pre-emption of state law claims filed before
arbitration was instituted and how they treated claims filed after arbitration.
Although no post-Allis-Chalmers decision rests on this distinction, a review
of post-Allis-Chalmers decisions arising both before and after arbitrations
reveals no difference in treatment. 369 However, at least one decision, in the
course of holding Allis-Chalmers precluded a retaliatory discharge claim,
363. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4807 n.13.
364. Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985); Cavins v. Aetna Life In-
surance Co., 609 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 124 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2688 (S.D. Ala. 1987). But see Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 125 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2481, 2484 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
not pre-empted).
365. Strachan, 768 F.2d at 705; accord Kirby v. Allegheny Bev. Corp., 811 F.2d 253,
255-56 (4th Cir. 1987).
366. Marine Transport Lines v. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots,
609 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Aello v. Apex Marine Corp., 610 F. Supp. 1255, 1260
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
367. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
56 U.S.L.W. 3263 (Oct. 13, 1987).
368. Cavins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 609 F. Supp. 309, 313 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
369. Compare, e.g., Barnes v. Purex Corp., No. 85-2283 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1985)
(holding wrongful discharge claim precluded after arbitration); with Strachan v. Union Oil
Co., 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985) and Cavins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 609 F. Supp. 309
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (decisions holding various state tort claims precluded because of failure to
exhaust grievance and arbitration remedies).
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gave reason for some concern in this area. 7° It found pre-emption for
failure to exhaust arbitration, but its discussion suggested that it might have
allowed the same state claim to proceed once arbitration had been exhausted:
"An employee must first present his claim of retaliatory discharge as a
grievance. Federal law requires a unionized employee to exhaust contrac-
tually created grievance procedures before filing suit in a court for discharge
and violation of the collective bargaining agreement."',
While what the court says is correct as far as it goes, two things must
be emphasized. First, the federal policy favoring arbitration raises issues of
pre-emption, not of exhaustion. The policy applies with the same force
without regard to whether the employee has or has not already arbitrated
the core of his state claim before filing suit. Second, while a suit following
the arbitration would be allowed, it would not be a suit under state law
for retaliatory discharge. Rather, it would be a suit under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act to determine whether the arbitration
decision should be set aside. The inquiry would not be whether the individ-
ual's state law right had been violated, but rather whether the arbitration
proceeding was fair and regular, whether the employer repudiated the
contract, and whether the union had breached its duty of fair representation.
Thus, Allis-Chalmers may or may not have resolved the confusion about
this issue.
4. Parties Involved
Post-Allis-Chalmers decisions have strengthened the trend of extending
arbitral pre-emption to those acting on the employer's behalf, recognizing
that insurance companies as well as supervisors, can benefit from arbitral
pre-emption. In an unpublished decision, 372 Judge Seyborne Lynne, author
of Mason v. Continental Group,373 and Reese v. Mead Corp. , 374 held that
the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the grievance procedure precluded assault
and battery and false imprisonment claims against his employer's security
officers because they conducted an investigatory interview leading up to his
discharge and his discharge was arbitrable under the collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in Cavins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 375 held that an
employee's failure to exhaust the grievance procedure precluded his subse-
quent breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay benefits, outrage, con-
spiracy, and loss of consortium claims against the employer's health and
disability carrier because "resolution of the present plaintiff's five state law
370. Clark v. Momence Packing Co., 637 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21, 1985).
371. Id. at 19.
372. See Hunt v. Alabama Power Company, No. CV84-L-0306-S (N.D. Ala. Dec. 18,
1985).
373. 569 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
374. 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,732 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
375. 609 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Wis. 1985).
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claims is . . .'substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.
376
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
in Nicholson v. Amalgamated Life Insurance Co., 31" rejected a contention
that there was a difference between delay in payment of benefits based on
on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and bad faith
delay in payment based upon state law, and held pre-empted the plaintiff's
bad faith delay in payment claim against the employer's health insurance
carrier because plaintiff failed to exhaust the grievance and arbitration
procedure. 37 8 Thus, it appears from Cavins and Nicholson that pre-emption
extends to the employer's insurance company as well.
One issue regarding the parties' identity apparently did not arise before
Allis Chalmers but has arisen since-the identity of the plaintiff. This issue
can arise in two ways. First, as in Varnum,3" Anderson, 380 and Bale,381 the
issue can arise when a bargaining unit employee files suit to recover for
promises made when he or she applied for work. As discussed previously,
Bale correctly found pre-emption and Anderson and Varnum erroneously
reached the opposite conclusion.3 82 Second, someone outside the bargaining
unit might file suit in connection with a former unit employee's rights. One
example would be a unit employee's widow's suit for bad faith failure to pay life
insurance benefits. Although research reveals no such case to date, the
answer here would appear obvious. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,313
which involved severance pay, would compel the conclusion that the suit is
pre-empted as long as the widow has access to the grievance and arbitration
procedure.3 8 It is difficult to believe that the Court would have decided
Allis-Chalmers differently had the plaintiff been the employee's widow
claiming bad faith refusal to pay life insurance.
V. CONCLUSION
Allis-Chalmers and other recent decisions have done much to clarify the
parameters of arbitral pre-emption. By making clear that Garmon pre-emption
affects subject matter jurisdiction, the Court in Davis has provided a strong
basis for contending that the same is true of arbitral pre-emption. On the
other hand, those supporting the view that arbitral pre-emption always is a
376. Cavins, 609 F. Supp. at 313 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
220 (1985)).
377. 616 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
378. Id. at 321.
379. 804 F.2d 638 (lth Cir. 1986).
380. 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986).
381. 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986).
382. See supra notes 356-62, and accompanying text.
383. 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
384. Id. The plaintiff has no access to the grievance procedure when Belknap would preclude
pre-emption. See supra note 330.
[Vol. 44:345
MUDDY WATERS
waivable defense have available the argument that the agreement of parties to a
dispute does not confer nor remove a court's subject matter jurisdiction,
and language in Allis-Chalmers indicating that state law confines arbitral
pre-emption in ways that it does not normally confine subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court will have to decide whether the nature of arbitral
pre-emption is similar to Garmon pre-emption, or whether, in this instance,
the unique characteristics of arbitral pre-emption compel that it be treated
differently. Williams suggests the Court will follow Davis in the arbitral
pre-emption context as well.
The principal issues regarding the scope of arbitral pre-emption involve
the types of claims affected. Allis-Chalmers has virtually eliminated the
common analytical error of evaluating arbitral pre-emption claims under
Garmon, but has allowed courts to continue to save some state causes of
action from pre-emption by drawing analogies to the Alexander/Barrentinel
McDonald line of cases. The one area in which Garmon may retain influence
is in the defamation torts. Courts will continue to struggle with the appl-
icability of Linn, a Garmon-progeny decision, to except libel and slander
claims from arbitral pre-emption.
The exception in Allis-Chalmers for independent state claims likely will
continue to preserve benefits claims under unemployment compensation and
workers' compensation from arbitral pre-emption, and will provide a basis
for the court to continue to preserve certain types of wrongful discharge
claims as well. An exception covering benefits cases seems logical; as New
York Tel. Co. recognizes, remedies such as unemployment compensation
have traditionally remained available since before the Taft-Hartley Act was
passed. The same logic warrants preservation of state safety and health
standards; the portion of Oliver that mandates this seems to survive Met-
ropolitan Life.
While the preservation of any wrongful discharge claims would seem
to allow the Allis-Chalmers exception to swallow the Allis-Chalmers rule,
result-oriented courts will tend to follow this course if the discharge violates
a statute or a public policy, and if they perceive unions as less effective
than new state wrongful discharge actions in protecting employee rights, or
if they attach great importance to the superiority of these new wrongful
discharge tort remedies over relief available through the grievance and
arbitration procedure. Courts that resist result-oriented temptations will find
it easier, under Allis-Chalmers, to look beyond the nature of the particular
state claims raised and the available remedies, and will ascertain pre-emption
according to the nature of the underlying conduct involved. Even in these
courts, however, the applicability of arbitral pre-emption may be affected
significantly by the court's view of the union's ability to protect the grievant
and the arbitrator's ability to make the grievant whole. 385
385. If these result-oriented courts ultimately prevail upon the Supreme Court to preserve
from pre-emption the new state law actions in derogation of the traditional employee-at-will
rule, the heart of the industrial form of self-government as established by the Steelworkers
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With the expansion of arbitral pre-emption of new claims will come the
expansion of the doctrine to new parties. Already, since Allis-Chalmers,
lower federal court decisions have recognized that claims against insurance
carriers that provide collectively bargained benefits and claims against
supervisory employees are covered by arbitral pre-emption to the same
extent as would be claims against the employer itself. With the expanding
scope of pre-emption, courts will have to consider whether collective bar-
gaining agreement signatories other than the employer can raise the arbitral
pre-emption defense. If an electrical subcontractor's employee has a dispute
with a signatory who is the general contractor or the project owner, would
the agreement's arbitration clause be the employee's exclusive remedy if the
clause did not, under Warrior & Gulf Navigation, except such disputes?
Logic would compel an affirmative response, but this is the sort of issue
that many courts will have to face soon.
There remains one significant issue regarding the parties involved that
the courts will have to resolve after Allis Chalmers-the impact, if any, on
pre-emption when the plaintiff is not, has not been, and does not aspire to
be a bargaining unit employee, but whose suit implicates the collective
agreement. What if the plaintiff bringing the bad faith claim in Allis
Chalmers had been a bargaining unit employee's widow seeking life insur-
ance? The answer would appear to be that pre-emption remains a barrier
because she stands in her husband's shoes just as the carrier stands in the
employer's shoes. If she cannot file a grievance, however, then her claim
should not be pre-empted. Courts will face these and similar issues when,
as in the case posited, the employee is not the plaintiff, or, as in Varnum
and Anderson, the plaintiff is not an employee.
As the doctrine of arbitral pre-emption develops, every employer should
recognize four things. First, federal courts are more likely than state courts
to look kindly on pre-emption claims, so removal of an action filed in state
court always should be considered when there is an arbitration clause in
the picture.86 Second, state and federal forums in states such as California,
which recognize many exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, appear
more likely to find that these exceptions, rather than arbitration, are better
Trilogy will likely fade from the prominent place it now occupies. The decline in unionization
suggests that this could happen in the not-too-distant future. With the decrease in union power
to protect employee rights, the Court may well conclude that wrongful discharge actions based
on state law are the employee's only protection. If this happens, the continuing need for
uniform federal labor policy and current jury excesses should prompt Congress to enact federal
wrongful discharge legislation, with decisions to be adjudicated either by a federal agency or
by mandatory arbitration. If the latter route is chosen, the sound rationale of Allis-Chalmers
may continue to play an important role.
386. Removal sometimes may prove difficult. At least one decisions since Allis-Chalmers
has side-stepped that decision by treating pre-emption as a defense that need not be considered




remedies for the aggrieved employees .38 Accordingly, while it is good advice
for all employers, employers in states recognizing many such exceptions
should make certain in all grievance settlements that the employee releases
his or her rights under state lav claims as well. Third, an employer still
can benefit from arbitration even in cases in which state law makes plain
that pre-emption is not available. While the arbitrator's determination may
not be preclusive of a subsequent state law claim, a favorable decision
nevertheless is strong evidence of the propriety of the discharge, and an
arbitration transcript can be used to impeach the grievant's credibility. Title
VII decisions following arbitrations under Alexander make clear the value
of arbitrations even absent pre-emption."' Finally, and most importantly,
every employer should consider carefully the nature and scope of the arbitral
pre-emption doctrine, as redefined, in negotiating and administering its
collective bargaining agreement.
Allis-Chalmers has not cleared up all of the uncertainty about arbitral
pre-emption, but it has made a start. Lower courts since Allis-Chalmers
demonstrate a heightened awareness of the arbitral pre-emption doctrine,
but their perpetuation of certain misconceptions makes clear that the
Court's job is not finished. The nature of arbitral pre-emption remains to
be settled, and the misapplication of Linn and Alexander still must be
corrected. Until this is done, the doctrine of arbitral pre-emption will remain
submerged in muddy waters.
a
387. The two companion cases to Allis-Chalmers, see supra note 181, both involve
California law. California law recognizes numerous exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. See generally L. LARsoN & P. BOROWSKY, UNiUsT DisMISSAL § 10.05[2].
388. See, e.g., Becton v. Detroit Terminal, 490 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 687 F.2d 140 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1982).
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